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A permanent international criminal tribunal has been the sub-
ject of debate and resolutions in the United Nations General As-
sembly for many years.  In December 1994, General Assembly
Resolution 49/53 established an ad hoc committee to review the
major substantive and administrative issues arising from the draft
statute prepared by the International Law Commission pursuant to
the establishment of a permanent international criminal court.1  In
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small litigation firm in the Washington D.C. area.  He graduated from Rutgers School
of Law in 1990 and received his LL.M. magna cum laude in Intercultural Human
Rights from Saint Thomas University School of Law in 2004 where he is currently a
JSD candidate. The author would like to thank his wife, Tamara L. Crouch, for her
continuing assistance and encouragement.
1 The origins of an international criminal court can be traced back to a proposal
made by Gustav Moynier, a founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
who recommended a permanent court in 1872 in response to the crimes of the
Franco-Prussian war. See Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International
Criminal Court: A Paradox of “Operation Enduring Freedom,” 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP.
L. 19, 25 (2003).  1899 saw the First Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes designed to discuss an international forum for the enforce-
ment of internationally recognized norms. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L.
Blakesley, The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New World Order, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 151, 152 (1992).  Other commentators trace the idea of an interna-
tional criminal court to a debate following Germany’s defeat in the First World War.
E.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Summer in Rome, Spring in the Hague, Winter in Washington? U.S.
Policy Towards the International Criminal Court, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 557, 562 n.17 (2003).
At that debate, during the Preliminary Peace Conference, it was suggested that the
Kaiser, inter alia, be held for trial for “offences against the laws and customs of war
and the laws of humanity.” Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and
on Enforcement of Penalties: Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 14 AM. J.
INT’L L. 95, 123 (1920).  Following the Second World War, an international criminal
tribunal was established at Nuremberg and effectively employed the rule of law in
trying those accused of war crimes among the German High Command.  The United
States opposed the trials after World War I because of the vagueness of the term “laws
of humanity,” and because the trials would impose extraterritorial liability on heads of
state and thus circumvent state sovereignty. Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28,
1919, art. 227, reprinted in 13 SUPPLEMENT AM. J. INT’L. L. 250 (1919).  The position of
the United States (along with Great Britain) concerning an international criminal
court following World War II was initially hostile, instead leaning toward summary
execution.  However, the United States’ position subsequently changed, and the court
was actually embraced by the Truman Administration. See Sadat, supra, at 564, citing
ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL chs. 2-6 (1990). See generally ROBERT
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December 1998, General Assembly Resolution 53/105 called for
the Secretary General to convene the preparatory commission to
discuss ways to enhance the effectiveness and acceptance of the
Court established under the Statute of Rome.2  The International
Criminal Court was heralded as “a global commitment to hold dic-
tators and other perpetrators of gross [human rights] violations ac-
countable for their crimes.”3
Despite overwhelming approval by the world’s nation states,
with 139 nations voting in favor of the Rome Statute and 97 nations
subsequently ratifying the Statute (as of October 2004),4 the
United States has taken extraordinary steps to exempt itself from
the jurisdiction of the Court.  This is ironic in light of the fact that
“[t]he United States played a key role in negotiating the original
treaty—particularly in ensuring due process and the rights of the
accused. ”5  In the last few years, the United States has undertaken
unprecedented diplomatic, legislative, and executive measures de-
signed to diminish the effectiveness of the Court.  These measures
have not only damaged the reputation of the United States interna-
E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG (Harper & Row 1983); WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY
ON TRIAL (Southern Methodist University Press 1954 (1999) (1954)); BRADLEY F.
SMITH, THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD 1944-45
(1982); BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (1977).
2 Subsequent to Resolution 49/53 in December 1994 and prior to Resolution 53/
105 in December 1998, the General Assembly passed three additional resolutions
dealing with the proposed International Criminal Court: Resolution 50/46 (Decem-
ber 1995) establishing the Preparatory Committee; Resolution 51/207 (December
1996) reaffirming the Preparatory Committee and directing it to submit a draft stat-
ute of the international criminal court for consideration and finalization by a diplo-
matic conference of plenipotentiaries to be held in 1998; and Resolution 52/160
(December 1997) accepting the offer of the government of Italy to host the confer-
ence in accordance with Resolution 51/207.  Resolutions 54/105 (December 1999),
55/155 (December 2000), and 56/85 (December 2001) all called for the Preparatory
Committee to, among other things, reconvene and “discuss ways to enhance the effec-
tiveness and acceptance of the Court,” and Resolution 57/23 (November 2002) dealt
with the performance of ministerial functions.  Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, General Assembly Resolutions, available at http://www.un.org/law/
icc/gares/gares.htm.
3 Human Rights First, The International Criminal Court, at http://www.humanrights
first.org/international_justice/icc/icc.htm (last visited May 1, 2005) [hereinafter
Human Rights First].
4 See United Nations Rome Statute of the International Court, at http://www.un.
org/law/icc/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
5 Human Rights First, supra note 3. Additionally, the United States backed an
International Criminal Court from Truman’s enthusiasm for the Nuremberg tribu-
nals to the significant role the U.S. played in supporting the Rome Conference in-
cluding sending delegates to assist in developing the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, and the Elements of Crimes.  John Washburn, The International Criminal
Court Arrives – The U.S. Position: Status and Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 873, 878
(2002),
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tionally, but have irreparably harmed the protection and promo-
tion of human rights worldwide.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 resulted in a fun-
damental policy shift with regard to U.S. military aid.  The new cri-
teria for receipt of military aid emphasize the worldwide war on
terrorism at the cost of international human rights.  Previously,
countries which engaged in massive human rights violations have
been denied U.S. military aid, but “[t]he modifications in the U.S.
foreign military assistance program make it easier for known viola-
tors to acquire the tools of abuse, thus implicating the United
States in abuses that result.”6  One new prerequisite to military aid
is the execution of bilateral immunity agreements exempting the
parties from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
(with certain enumerated exceptions).7  Accordingly, states with
the worst human rights records may be given military aid if they
agree to sign treaties that will exempt them (and the United
States) from scrutiny of human rights violations by the ICC.  Re-
cent developments in the war against terrorism, including events
during the Iraqi occupation and elsewhere, give credence to the
proposition that the current administration has drastically de-pri-
oritized prohibitions against human rights violations, paying them
little more than lip service.  These policies toward the war on ter-
rorism and the anti-ICC treaties are two pieces of a mosaic of indif-
ference that guarantee an increase of human suffering and a lack
of accountability for brutal leaders and other human rights
violators.
This paper will briefly discuss the background and develop-
ment of the International Criminal Court including its historic
context, jurisdiction, and scope, and will explore the hostile ac-
tions taken by the United States calculated to render the Court
powerless.  It will consider the legal basis of these actions and delve
into the official U.S. criticisms of the Court along with rebuttals
and attempt to identify the real motives for this antagonism.  Fi-
nally, this paper will assess the implications of the current adminis-
tration’s anti-ICC policies for international human rights.
6 Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Dealings: Changes to US Military Assistance After
September 11, 14 U.S. 1, 2 (Feb. 2002), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2002/us-
mil/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2004) [hereinafter HRW, Dangerous Dealings].
7 American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA), Pub. L. No. 107-206,
§ 2007, 116 Stat. 899, 905.
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I. BACKGROUND
1. Historical Context
Modern international criminal law began in the aftermath of
World War II at Nuremberg and Tokyo, introducing the concept of
individual liability for state offenders.  Prior to Nuremberg all pros-
ecutions, if any, were conducted in the domestic courts.8  At Nu-
remberg, the allies tried the German High Command to create a
historical record, to begin to establish a legal precedent for the
international imposition of individual criminal liability, and to de-
ter future human rights violations.  Since Nuremberg and Tokyo,
there have been 274 multilateral treaties ratified that require states
to criminalize certain conduct.  However, for many years after Nu-
remberg, military tribunals and domestic courts continued to con-
duct criminal trials of international scope.
In 1993 and 1995 the Security Council formed two ad hoc
tribunals for trial of serious violations of humanitarian law in Yugo-
slavia (ICTY)9 and Rwanda (ICTR).10  These tribunals were the first
of their kind since Nuremberg and Tokyo.  Recently, the United
8 Sadat, supra note 1, at 562 n.17.  While the Treaty of Versailles did reach a com-
promise position allowing the arraignment of the Kaiser, along with others, for the
“offense against international morality and the sanctity of Treaties” before an interna-
tional tribunal, he was not tried for crimes against humanity and ultimately never
faced trial; of the handful of people that were brought before the tribunal all but a
few were acquitted.  Thus, this cannot seriously be considered an international crimi-
nal tribunal in the modern sense as there was no accountability for the perpetrators,
no reference to international criminal violations beyond the vague allegation of “in-
ternational morality,” no defined terms or elements of the crime(s) and no significant
international recognition of the tribunal’s authority.  Both Holland and post-war Ger-
many successfully refused to extradite individuals (including the Kaiser) to the tribu-
nals. See id.; Matthew Lipman, Nuremberg: Forty Five Years Later, 7 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1,
10-11 (1991); L.C. Green, The Law of Armed Conflict and the Enforcement of International
Criminal Law, 22 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 10-12 (1984); Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the
Nuremberg Trials, 16-18, 29 (1982).
9 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is located in The
Hague and was established by Security Council Resolution 827 on May 25, 1993.  It
has jurisdiction to hear criminal matters occurring in the former Yugoslavia since
1991 that involve egregious violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of
the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity.  United Nations,
The ICTY at a Glance: General Information, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.
htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2004).
10 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is located in Arusha,
United Republic for Tanzania and was established by Security Council Resolution 955
on November 8, 1994.  United Nations, The ICTR at a Glance, General Information, at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/geninfo/index.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).  It as-
sumes jurisdiction over criminal matters involving genocide and serious violations of
international humanitarian law that took place on the territory of Rwanda and neigh-
boring states between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994. Id.
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Nations has formed a “hybrid” tribunal in Sierra Leone and East
Timor (with plans for Cambodia)11 to try crimes against humanity
in a forum that facilitates collaboration with the domestic author-
ity, as directed by the U.N. Security Council.12  These tribunals are
new expressions of previously accepted principles of the inaliena-
bility of human rights and the individual accountability of violators
who commit atrocities.
The International Criminal Court was formed during a rare
moment of multilateral cooperation and expands the primacy of
international criminal law by giving permanence to the tribunal
and attempting to make all member states accountable.  Moreover,
the ICC is different from its predecessor courts because it was cre-
ated by treaty and is not an organ of the U.N.
2. Structure of the ICC
The Court is composed of 18 judges,13 six in each of the three
departments of pretrial, trial, and appeals.  There are nine-year
term limits that are non-renewable.14  Pretrial judges authorize and
oversee the investigations conducted by the prosecutor’s office15
and issue warrants.16  Trial judges conduct trials.17  Appellate
judges hear appeals18 and establish a body of precedent as well as
dissent.  The Appellate judges must remain in that division all nine
years, while the judges from the other divisions may rotate.  In
picking the judges, the Assembly of States will select no more than
two judges from any single state19 and will attempt to establish a
gender balance in the Court.
Prosecutors initiate and investigate allegations20 and are ar-
11 James Crawford et al., In the Matter of the Statute of the International Criminal Court
and in the Matter of Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United States Under Article 98(2) of the
Statute, A Joint Opinion at the Behest of the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, at 13 n.7
(June 5, 2003), at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_justice/Art98_06
1403.pdf
12 See Public Affairs Section, U. S. Embassy, Vienna, Aus., Fact Sheet: United States
Policy on the International Criminal Court, at http://www.usembassy.at/en/
download/pdf/icc.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005) [hereinafter Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy
on the ICC].
13 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 36(1),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
14 Id. at art. 36(9)(a).
15 Id. at arts. 53(3)(a)(b) and 56(1)(c).
16 Id. at art. 57(3)(a).
17 Id. at art. 64.
18 Id. at art. 83.
19 Id. at art. 36(7).
20 Id. at art. 15.
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guably the most vulnerable to political pressures.  Indeed, the cur-
rent Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo has already received
(and declined) requests to inquire into U.S. conduct in the most
recent war against Iraq.21  The prosecutors represent the Assembly
of States at trial.22  The Assembly of States votes on management,
budget, elements of the crimes, and rules of procedure in evi-
dence, and elects judges and prosecutors.23  The Judges elect the
President, and the Registry is set up like a clerk’s office to oversee
the administrative and personnel matters.24
Among the most significant features of the ICC is its auton-
omy.  This design, which includes investigation, trial, and appeal
inclusive in four organs (1. The Presidency; 2. The Office of the
Prosecutor; 3. The Registry; and 4. The Appeals Division, Trial Di-
vision, and Pre-Trial Division)25 under one international rubric, in-
sulates the Court from U.N. Security Council scrutiny.  The quasi-
legislative function of the Assembly of States is unique among in-
ternational organizations because, while working groups of the
U.N. may draft particularized resolutions on an ad hoc basis, the
Assembly of States permanently sits and “legislates” both substan-
tive and procedural rules for the ICC.  In neither case, however, is
there a complete break from traditional understandings of the au-
thority of international organizations.  The ICC attempts to incor-
porate general accountability for all states, fundamental fairness,
and a permanent structure in which to operate.
3. Jurisdiction and Scope
One factor limiting the ICC is the narrow scope of its jurisdic-
tion.  Indeed, the Court assumes jurisdiction only under unusual
circumstances and is unwilling to encroach upon state sovereignty.
21 Ocampo has had both formal and informal discussions with various countries
relating to early complaints sounding in the crime of aggression for illegally waging
war against Iraq.  The Court has not defined aggression and therefore cannot prose-
cute these crimes.  James Podgers, An Unused Weapon, 37 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 1, Sept. 19,
2003.  Moreover, according to an editorial in the Christian Science Monitor dated
June 25, 2004, more than 100 complaints have been filed before the Court against
Americans.  The editorial postulates that Americans are in danger of political prose-
cution from the ICC based largely on the U.S. action against Iraq and the Abu Ghraib
prison scandal, but ignores the fatal jurisdictional constraints of a prosecution of U.S.
personnel in Iraq as neither the U.S. nor Iraq are signatories to the Rome Statute. See
Wary US Eye on UN Court, Commentary: The Monitor’s View, June 25, 2004, at http://
www.csmonitor.com/2004/0625/p08s03-comv.html.
22 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 42.
23 Id. at art. 112.
24 Id. at arts. 43-44.
25 Id. at art. 34.
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The Court will only hear four criminal charges: genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.26  Of the
four, crimes of aggression have not been defined (and thus are not
currently enforceable), and there is a seven-year delay for the en-
forcement of war crimes.  The offenses of crimes against humanity
and genocide only include acts that have occurred subsequent to
July 1, 2002.27  Therefore, complaints lodged with the ICC calling
for the prosecution of U.S. personnel for illegally waging war
against Iraq sounding in the crime of aggression (or war crimes)
are outside the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction and beyond the
reach of the prosecutor’s office.
The Court observes treaty-based jurisdiction that authorizes in-
ternational authority over certain offenses on the basis of their
egregious nature.  The Court will assume jurisdiction of nationals
from member states, even if the alleged crimes were committed in
the territory of non-member states, and nationals from non-mem-
ber states if the alleged crimes were committed in the territory of
member states.28  The United States has consistently maintained its
opposition to this jurisdictional basis as it could theoretically create
liability for U.S. personnel accused of crimes committed in ICC ju-
risdictions, despite official U.S. opposition to the Court.29  With re-
spect to fears of U.S. military personnel being prosecuted for their
actions in the war in Iraq, neither Iraq nor the U.S. are signatories
to the Rome Statute which creates an incurable jurisdictional de-
fect for allegations of crimes against humanity or genocide (aggres-
sion and war crimes are irrelevant as previously discussed).  The
Court’s jurisdiction must be grounded either in the accused’s state
of origin or in the state in which the offense allegedly occurred.30
The Court will hear all cases referred by the Security Council
and accept cases from non-member states that voluntarily consent
to the Court’s jurisdiction.31  This basis for jurisdiction could only
imperil U.S. personnel in Iraq with the consent of the U.S. govern-
26 Id. at art. 5.
27 Id. at arts. 11, 24.
28 Id. at art. 12.
29 See Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy on the ICC, supra note 12.
30 Personnel from Great Britain do not enjoy the same impunity from the ICC as
the U.S. because they are signatories to the Rome Statute and can be held accounta-
ble for any atrocities committed by British troops in Iraq. See generally Rome Statute,
supra note 13, arts. 5-8.
31 Id. at arts. 12-13.  The ICC received its first referral from the Security Council in
the matter of Darfur, Sudan on March 31, 2005 pursuant to SC Resolution 1593. See
Press Release SC/8351 at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/SC8351.doc.
htm.
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ment as any Security Council referral can be vetoed by the United
States.
The ICC observes the principle of complementarity.  This
principle, sometimes referred to as “default jurisdiction,”32 allows
the state to prosecute the offender if it chooses, (in accordance
with state sovereignty), and only allows the Court to hear the mat-
ter if the state is unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute in
good faith.33  The ICC will assume jurisdiction over previously tried
nationals only if their national trials were conducted in a biased
manner designed to allow them to evade criminal responsibility.34
Thus, the ICC will not act as a court of fourth instance,35 but
neither will it recognize the validity of sham trials.  By conceding to
the states the right to prosecute their own cases involving jus
cogens crimes, i.e., by giving them “the first bite of the apple,” the
ICC is acknowledging the state’s sovereign authority.  However, by
determining if the state is acting in good faith vis-a`-vis the prosecu-
tion, the Court is extending heretofore-accepted norms.
The scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction is one of the more subtle
features of its design.  It is careful to limit its scope to a narrow
focus and yet extend its jurisdiction to nationals of non-member
states.  It allows states to flex their muscles and defers to their au-
thority through the doctrine of complementarity, but reserves the
right to look over their shoulders and assume jurisdiction if they
fail in their duty to conduct appropriate investigations and
prosecutions.
4. Enforcement Difficulties
An initial observation of enforcement issues reveals the lack of
an ICC police force.  It does not have local investigators or prosecu-
tors; in fact, it does not have any local presence at all.  A collateral
32 Leila Sadat Wexler, Panel Discussion: Association of American Law Schools Panel on
the International Criminal Court, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 223, 250 (1999).
33 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 20.
34 Id.
35 The Preamble to the Rome Statute states, inter alia, “nothing in this Statute
shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene . . . in the internal affairs of
any State.”  Arguably, complementarity could be construed as permitting interference
in the internal affairs of states and thus violating the principles in the Preamble and
those of the Charter to the United Nations (Article 2[7]).  However, the Rome Stat-
ute prohibits state part[ies] from interfering in the internal affairs of any state and not
the International Criminal Court.  This provision makes sense as a safeguard to pre-
vent state parties from committing acts of aggression on other states in an effort to
bring them into compliance with the requirements of the Rome Statute but was not
intended to tie the hands of the Court in taking jurisdiction over a case.
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issue is the ICC’s limited funding, which is inadequate to conduct
thorough investigations around the globe.  Also, the ICC has infer-
ior claim to existing extradition treaties.  Accordingly, many theo-
rists postulate that the chief enforcement problem of the ICC is the
hostility from the U.S. and its attempts to undermine the Court’s
effectiveness.
The first two problems are two sides of the same coin.  Under
normal circumstances, local authorities are better equipped to deal
with local matters because they have superior resources and experi-
ence in dealing with them.  Often, however, because of the nature
of the crimes prosecuted by the ICC, normal circumstances do not
prevail and the local authority is incompetent or unable to pro-
ceed.  In many cases local authorities are per se biased because
they are the political allies of either the accused or their victims.
Under either scenario a fair and unbiased tribunal is impossible.
Additionally, many localities victimized by horrific crimes no
longer have an infrastructure, owing to years of protracted war and
conflict.  Some localities lack the funds to engage in lengthy and
expensive trials of mass defendants.  Impoverished states are likely
to take shortcuts in conducting trials in order to save money, result-
ing in probable deprivation of the accused’s right to a fair trial.36
Some commentators postulate that the U.S. opposition to the
Court has grave consequences for its viability and enforcement ca-
pabilities.  They opine that without U.S. assistance the Court will be
36 One example of a lack of funds and depleted infrastructure was the attempted
response to the genocide of Rwanda, which ultimately necessitated international in-
tervention in the form of the ad hoc tribunal.  Even with the intervention, Rwanda
has had to resort to the Gacaca court, a traditional tribal court named after the grass
upon which the tribal judges sit in judgment of the accused.  The judges usually have
no formal training in the law and judge persons accused, inter alia, of less egregious
offenses involved in the genocide.  They hear cases of complicity in genocide matters
that took place in their villages—villages of typically less than 100 persons.  These
tribunals are frequently prima facie biased because the judges are usually close rela-
tives or friends of the victims (or of the perpetrators).  The lack of funds in Rwanda
precludes changes of venue or the procurement of impartial, trained judges. See gen-
erally BBC News, Rwanda killers face local justice, Mar. 10, 2005, available at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4335405.stm (last visited Apr. 6, 2005). See also UK Em-
bassy of Rwanda, Genocide in Rwanda, available at http://www.ambarwanda.org.uk/ge-
nocide/index.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).  Additionally, a lack of funds and
infrastructure has required the formation of the hybrid ad hoc tribunals in Sierra
Leone and East Timor, and it is foreseeable that the same problems and needs may
exist  in Cambodia, Liberia, and the Congo, as well as other countries. See Richard
Dicker & Elise Keppler, Beyond the Hague: The Challenges of International Justice, in
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: WORLD REPORT 2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED CONFLICT, at
194 (Jan. 2004), available at http://hrw.org/wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2005).
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unable to secure the presence of the accused and suggest that the
International Criminal Court “lacks the institutional resources to
ensure that the defendants actually show up in The Hague.”37  The
U.S. could provide increased funding, international prestige, and
widespread acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdictional authority,
thereby legitimizing the fledgling Court in the international com-
munity, giving teeth to its mandate and facilitating effective en-
forcement.  Instead, many argue that the Bush administration has
employed tactics designed to immobilize the Court and limit its
jurisdiction.  The principal U.S. objections sound in state sover-
eignty and are predicated upon a lack of control by the U.S. be-
cause of the autonomous design of the Court.
5. United States’ Objections to the ICC
While testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, David J. Scheffer,38 head of the United States Delegation in
Rome, indicated that the government had six principal objections
to the Rome Statute.39  These objections included the pervasive ju-
risdiction of the Court, failure to provide a 10-year opt-out period
for crimes against humanity and war crimes, an autonomous prose-
cutor who can (with the consent of two judges) initiate investiga-
tions and prosecutions in a politically motivated fashion, the lack
of a requirement that the Security Council make a determination
prior to bringing a complaint for aggression, the possibility of ex-
panding the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court (to include
terrorism and drug crimes), and the prohibition against
reservations.40
37 Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
89, 92 (2003). These commentators point to the ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia and argue that without the “U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial might” the
ICTY would not have enjoyed its modest success in bringing war criminals to The
Hague. Id. at 92-93. See also Cosmos Eubany, Justice for Some? U.S. Efforts Under Article
98 to Escape the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 27 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 103, 127 (2003) (generally indicating that if the U.S. is successful in
negotiating Article 98 treaties it “could sound the death knell for the ICC”).
38 While articulating the United States’ concerns regarding the International
Criminal Court, Mr. Scheffer nonetheless recommended that President Clinton sign
the treaty in order to work out its flaws as a signatory and noted that, “[a]s a signatory,
the United States now is well armed to improve the treaty regime and advance our
commitment to international justice.”  David J. Scheffer, A Negotiator’s Perspective on the
International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
39 Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court:  An
Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 448-49 (2000).
40 Id. See also Robert T. Alter, International Criminal Court: A Bittersweet Year for
Supporters and Critics of the International Criminal Court, 37 INT’L L. 541, 543-44 (2003).
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Some of these objections were memorialized in a fact sheet
distributed by the Public Affairs Section of the United States Em-
bassy to Vienna, Austria.41  In that fact sheet, the U.S. cites addi-
tional opposition on the basis of state sovereignty because the
doctrine of complementarity allows the ICC to make a determina-
tion regarding a State’s willingness to initiate investigation and
prosecution.42  The U.S. position states that there are suitable alter-
natives to the ICC in the field of international justice.  These alter-
natives include domestic accountability, foreign assistance for
political, financial, legal and logistical support designed to imple-
ment domestic legal institutions, and ad hoc international tribu-
nals under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council.43
The counter argument postulates that the International Crimi-
nal Court cannot try defendants if they have been tried in another
forum, in good faith, under the general principles of double jeop-
ardy (ne bis in idem) as stipulated in Article 20(3).44  Under the
doctrine of complementarity, prosecutors can only bring cases pre-
viously heard in domestic tribunals if those defendants were never
truly placed in jeopardy.45  The burden of proving that a person
was not placed in jeopardy when she has been tried for atrocities in
a national court is an extremely difficult one.  The difficulty of
meeting this burden and overcoming the double jeopardy issues
will allegedly discourage investigations and prosecutions in all but
the most obvious sham domestic trials.  Double jeopardy issues re-
41 See Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy on the ICC, supra note 12.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2.  The reliance upon ad hoc tribunals seems insufficient as they are cre-
ated after the fact and have apparently done little to stem the tide of egregious
human rights violations.  They do not deter massive violations because there is no
surety that the Security Council will form such tribunals in any but the most notorious
cases and then only if politically expedient.  Ad hoc tribunals seem to be neither
efficient nor fair as “law must apply equally to everyone, everywhere” and “a prolifera-
tion of special ad hoc tribunals created by the Security Council after the harm had
been done, and covering only crimes committed in a limited area during a specific
time, was hardly a fair or efficient way to deter international criminality.”  Benjamin B.
Ferencz, Misguided Fears About the International Criminal Court, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV.
223, 228 (2003).
44 Article 20(3) states, “No person who has been tried by another court for con-
duct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to
the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: (a) Were for the purpose
of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or im-
partially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law
and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with
an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”  Rome Statute, supra note 13, art.
20(3).
45 Id.
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present a significant limitation on the discretion of the prosecu-
tor’s office and should have a deterrent effect on politically
motivated prosecutions.
Moreover, critics charge that the U.S. contest of ICC jurisdic-
tion is without merit because the Court’s jurisdiction is synony-
mous with that of the territorial state.  Under the internationally
recognized territorial jurisdiction,46 foreign nationals can be prose-
cuted by the State in which they commit a crime; thus, if a U.S.
national committed a crime in a foreign country, she would be sub-
ject to the law of that country and under the jurisdiction of its
courts.47  If the same U.S. national committed genocide or crimes
against humanity in a foreign signatory country, and that country
chose to relinquish jurisdiction to the ICC (or refused to prosecute
and the ICC assumed jurisdiction pursuant to complementarity),
then the jurisdiction would still be grounded in the foreign coun-
try’s seizure of jurisdiction in accordance with the territorial princi-
ple,48 but in no case would the U.S. retain jurisdiction.49
46 “The first of five general principles of jurisdiction is ‘the territorial principle,’
[which] determine[s] jurisdiction by reference to the place where the offence is com-
mitted, [and] is everywhere regarded as of primary importance and of fundamental
character.”  Lilian V. Faulhaber, American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, 40
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, n.118 (2003) (citing Research in International Law of the
Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
INT’L. L. 435, 445 (1935)).
47 This jurisdictional priority can be altered by agreement between states such as
in the case of SOFA and SOMA agreements, infra, involving U.S. military personnel
abroad and other extradition agreements specifically negotiated between states, but
these agreements generally determine the order of prosecution and not whether or
not the accused is to be prosecuted at all.  Crawford et al., supra note 11, at 17-23.
48 Acceptance by states of the jurisdiction of the ICC is analogous to changes in
domestic legislation because once a state has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court,
that jurisdiction becomes the law of the land and therefore binding upon foreign
nationals when they enter the territory (absent an agreement to the contrary between
the state and the origin state of the foreign national).
49 See Sadat & Carden, supra note 39, at 404.  Some members of Congress ex-
pressed concerns that Americans tried by the International Criminal Court would be
deprived of their constitutional rights, such as the right to refrain from self-incrimina-
tion and the right to a jury trial. See Faulhaber, supra note 46, at 549-50.  These criti-
cisms are disingenuous as the constitutional rights of American citizens have no
extraterritorial application for foreign prosecutions of offenses committed abroad
and thus the International Criminal Court would not constitute any greater depriva-
tion to the rights of U.S. citizens abroad than foreign national courts.  Ambassador
David J. Scheffer stated, “The fact that the treaty requires trial by judges and not by
jury is not surprising in an international criminal court that merges common and civil
law practice.  It is well settled extradition practice to accept trial without jury outside
the United States.”  Scheffer, supra note 38, at 13.  Additionally, American ser-
vicemembers face no deprivation of rights under the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court as the United States military justice system does not afford the ac-
cused the right to a jury trial or many other Constitutional rights enjoyed by civilians.
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Therefore, under generally recognized international principles of
criminal jurisdiction, the U.S. would not lose any sovereign rights,
as its primary jurisdiction would never have vested.
The ICC’s jurisdiction is grounded in the primary territorial
jurisdiction of the state in which the alleged offenses took place
and the accused is entitled to the same protections afforded
therein.  Indeed, some commentators argue that this jurisdictional
scheme would provide more protections to the accused then cur-
rent international law, as the International Criminal Court is under
the scrutiny of multiple nations and the substantive and procedural
safeguards resulting from multilateral negotiations will provide
greater protections then those provided by many national courts.50
The U.S. contends that the office of the prosecutor is subject
to abuse as it could initiate investigations based upon political
motivations and that it will target the U.S. and U.S. nationals.51
The U.S. Department of Defense has unwaveringly maintained its
opposition to the Court, ostensibly grounded in the fear that U.S.
military personnel may fall under its jurisdiction; hence, the Penta-
gon seeks to deny the ICC any “operational impact.”52  This posi-
tion is grounded in the United States’ vulnerability due to its wide
scale peacekeeping missions and military presence.  On the other
See Faulhaber, supra note 46, at 550; see also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11, 18 (1955).
50 Faulhaber, supra note 46, at 552.
51 The United States and other NATO military leaders were the subject of an in-
quiry by the prosecutor’s office of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia in connection with allegations that the seventy-eight-day bombing raid on
Kosovo during the Spring of 1999 involved war crimes.  However, in a report issued by
the Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, a committee established on May 14, 1999 by
the Chief Prosecutor to assess criminal allegations and material accompanying them
found that the allegations did not merit full investigation. See Final Report to the Prose-
cutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, ICTY Doc. PR/P.I.S./510-E, June 13, 2000, available at http://
www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm.  The prosecutor then adopted the find-
ings of the report and decided not to open a criminal investigation into any aspect of
NATO’s 1999 air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Press Release,
Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor’s Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign
(June 13, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p510-e.htm.  This report was
widely criticized as politically motivated in favor of NATO and as a departure from
normal substantive and procedural practices employed by that office.  The report sub-
jected NATO to an uncritical appraisal and took verbatim representations made by its
spokespersons, thus casting doubt on the prosecutor’s impartiality.  Cf. Timothy Wil-
liam Waters, Unexploded Bomb: Voice, Silence, and Consequence at The Hague Tribunals; A
Legal and Rhetorical Critique, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1015, 1122 (2003) (noting the
prosecutor’s excessive discretion not to act given the particular “political and institu-
tional atmosphere” of the Tribunal).
52 Kenneth Roth, Fight the Good Fight, Guardian (London), Oct. 22, 2002, at 8.
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hand, the Statute places extensive constraints on the power of the
prosecutor (many of which reflect U.S. government proposals) in-
cluding review of all investigations by an independent judiciary and
limited subject matter jurisdiction, which includes only a small
number of very serious offenses.  Additionally, while it has not yet
occurred, many observers believe that the Assembly of States will
make a determination under Article 5(2) that the U.N. Security
Council should decide when the crime of aggression has taken
place.53  If this occurs, it would further restrict the prosecutor’s
discretion.
In the course of negotiations, the U.S. proposed a ten-year
opt-out period for war crimes and a seven-year compromise was
achieved.  Critics contend that it is disingenuous for the U.S. to cite
this three-year difference as a cause for its refusal to ratify, as it was
a product of a compromise in which representatives of the U.S.
took an active part.  The United States’ assertion that the Statute’s
prohibition against reservations from its terms is a departure from
accepted practice is incompatible with the fact that the crimes in
the Statute are universally condemned.54  Additionally, it is a mis-
statement of international law as the Restatement of Foreign Rela-
tions expressly articulates the capability of those drafting treaties to
prohibit reservations.55
It is significant to note that the United States never espoused
great fears concerning the formation of the ad hoc Tribunal for
the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia when, in fact, the
same criticisms that the current administration is leveling against
the International Criminal Court could be leveled against the
ICTY.  The ICTY affords no right to a jury trial and investigations
and prosecutions are initiated solely at the discretion of the prose-
cutor.56  While the ICTY requires that indictments be confirmed by
only one judge57 prior to becoming effective, the ICC prosecutor is
required to satisfy two judges before initiating an investigation,58
and the case is subject to judicial review, including interlocutory
review,59 throughout the entire prosecution.  Moreover, the ICC
53 Sadat & Carden, supra note 39, at 450.
54 Id. at 451.
55 Id. at 452.
56 See ICTY At a Glance, General Information, Proceedings, at http://www.un.org/icty/
glance/index.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2004) (“Investigations are initiated by the
Prosecutor at her own discretion or on the basis of information received from individ-
uals, governments, international organisations or non-governmental organisations.”).
57 Id. (“Indictments must be confirmed by a judge prior to becoming effective.”)
58 Rome Statute, supra note 13, arts. 15(3), 57(2)(a).
59 Id. at art. 82.
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prosecutor must refrain from prosecution for one year if so or-
dered by the Security Council,60 and is constantly subject to the
scrutiny of the Assembly of States.61  Overall, the restraints on the
ICC prosecutors far exceed those on the prosecutors for the
ICTY.62
Another distinction between the two bodies is that the ICTY is
empowered to exercise superior jurisdictional authority compared
to the ICC.  At its discretion, the ICTY can assert primacy over na-
tional courts63 without cause, while under the doctrine of comple-
mentarity, the ICC can only assume jurisdiction if the national
court is unable or unwilling to prosecute.64  The ICC prosecutors’
hands are tied unless they can satisfy the considerable burden of
showing that the national court trial is a sham.  Yet, despite the
immensely greater discretionary powers of the ICTY and its greater
imposition on state sovereignty, the United States has never voiced
the same concerns or mounted the kind of venomous attack
against the ICTY that it has against the ICC.65  The ICTY operates
60 Id. at art. 16.
61 Id. at art. 112.
62 Some argue that the current administration should not fear the ICC prosecu-
tors’ political motivations based upon the experience of the ICTY’s timid treatment of
the 1999 NATO bombing campaign. See Waters, supra note 51, at 1124-26. See also
Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief
Response, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 855, 884 (1999).  However, despite the ICTY
prosecutors’ wider discretion than the ICC, the ICTY is funded by the Security Coun-
cil and therefore arguably lacks the autonomy of the ICC, which is funded by the
member states.  Whether or not this lack of autonomy affects the judgment of the
prosecutors’ office is subject to speculation, but some theorists contend that the ICC
would be subject to the same results (i.e., bias in favor of U.S. interests instead of
against them).  Those theorists argue that the ICC would operate “in a political and
institutional atmosphere that encourages caution, conciliation, and co-optation, cre-
ating incentives for the Prosecution to reach the kinds of conclusions it does in the
[ICTY] Inquiry . . . .”  Waters, supra note 51, at 1122.  In either event, the prospect of
U.S. personnel being targeted for political persecution appears remote.
63 U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Fact Sheet: Gen-
eral Information, at www.un.org/icty/cases/factsheets/generalinfo-e.htm (last updated
Dec. 10, 2004) (“The ICTY and national courts have concurrent jurisdiction over seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia.
However, the ICTY can claim primacy over national courts, and may take over na-
tional investigations and proceedings at any stage if this proves to be in the interest of
international justice.”).
64 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 20.
65 In a synopsis, infra, of the statement issued by Jean David Levitte, Security Coun-
cil representative from France, regarding Resolution 1422 (exempting U.N.
peacekeeping forces from liability from the ICC as a condition of the renewal of
peacekeeping forces in Bosnia (2002)), Mr. Lavitte stated that the Rome Statute had
given the U.S. much more meaningful safeguards than the safeguards of the ICTY,
which had never elicited the slightest concern in Washington.  U.N. Press Release,
Bosnia Mission Mandate in Question, As Security Council Debates Legal Exposure of
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with the blessing of the United States and the United States was
instrumental in its formation.  However, the U.S. military is not ex-
empt from prosecution by the ICTY.66  This is noteworthy given the
fact that the United States contributed the most peacekeepers and
had a significant military presence in the former Yugoslavia.  It is
no more far-fetched that U.S. military personnel would be prose-
cuted for their peacekeeping activities in the former Yugoslavia
than that they would be prosecuted in the International Criminal
Court.67  This analysis suggests that the U.S. opposition to the In-
ternational Criminal Court is not predicated on fears of the liabil-
ity of its soldiers, but on perceived threats to state sovereignty and
contemporary policy initiatives.
II. U.S. EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE COURT
1. U.S. Reaction to the Rome Statute
Throughout his term of office, George W. Bush has taken sev-
eral affirmative steps to quash the viability of an autonomous Inter-
national Criminal Court.  Recently, these steps have proven
increasingly vitriolic and effective.  Through domestic legislation,
diplomatic maneuvers, and what some describe as shameless bully-
ing, this administration and other U.S. officials have taken steps
that seriously threaten to undermine the Court.  On November 3,
2003, in remarks given to the American Enterprise Institute, John
R. Bolton, then Under Secretary for Arms Control and Interna-
tional Security, stated that “[T]he United States is engaged in a
UN Peacekeepers, July 10, 2002, 4568th Meeting (AM & PM) – SC/7445/Rev.1, avail-
able at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7445Rev1.doc.htm (last visited
May 1, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release: Bosnia].
66 See Fact Sheet: General Information, supra note 63.  The ICTY is charged with prose-
cuting natural persons who may have committed one or more of the enumerated
offenses on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Id.  There is no dis-
claimer or limitation on the tribunal’s mandate regarding the nationality of the target
of the prosecution and thus anyone present on the territory after 1991 is liable,
whether it be a U.S. soldier or a native. See id.
67 Although the main thrust of the ICTY prosecutors’ inquiry into the 1999 bomb-
ing raid was to review the propriety of the decisions of the NATO leadership, the
actions of individual soldiers came under scrutiny.  Waters, supra note 51, at 1023,
1047-48.  One of the allegations concerned the bombing of a bridge over the Grdelica
Gorge (while a passenger train was crossing) and suggested the possibility of the pi-
lot’s individual liability. Id.  In that case two laser-guided bombs fired sequentially
struck the train. Id.  The Committee declared no liability for the first missile, but was
divided as to whether the pilot was reckless in firing the second. Id.  Ultimately, the
Committee agreed not to call for an investigation, and found that the pilot could not
react quickly enough to prevent the propulsion of either of the weapons in time to
save the passengers. Id.
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worldwide effort . . . that would prohibit the surrender of U.S. per-
sons to the Court,” and “a global campaign . . . that will ensure U.S.
persons are not subjected to the ICC’s jurisdiction.”68
Even before the conference in Rome, U.S. actions reflected
opposition to the concept of a permanent international criminal
tribunal.  Accordingly, as the Conference approached “the attacks
on the Court in the United States grew increasingly shrill,”69 and
“[U.S.] Senator Jessie Helms (R-N.C.) has declared war on the ICC
for not giving ‘100 percent protection’ from prosecution to Ameri-
can GIs.”70  Additionally, Senator Helms, who was the Chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,71 stated that the ICC would
be “dead on arrival” absent an allowance for United States veto
over cases being brought before it.72  The U.S. Delegation to Rome
apparently retained this attitude.
David Scheffer was the former Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Issues and was the head of the U.S. Delegation to Rome.
While working in this capacity he negotiated, inter alia, the inclu-
sion of Article 98(2) to the Statute, which states:
68 John R. Bolton, American Justice and the International Criminal Court, Re-
marks at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, at http://www.state.gov/
t/us/rm/25818.htm (Nov. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Bolton, Remarks at AEI].  John Bol-
ton was subsequently nominated by President Bush for the position of U.N. Ambassa-
dor in March 2005. See CNN.com, Bush Nominates Bolton as U.N. Ambassador, March 8,
2005, at http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/03/07/bolton/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
69 Sadat & Carden, supra note 39, at 447.
70 Ruth Wedgwood, Fiddling in Rome: America and the International Criminal Court, 77
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 20, 21 (1998).
71 The fledging ICC has suffered a series of domestic legislative challenges in the
United States.  Two earlier drafts of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act,
designed to withhold military aid to any country that is a signatory to the ICC, were
proposed but defeated.  S. 2726, 106 Cong. § 7 (2000) and S. Amdt. 1690 to National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, S. 1438, 107 Cong. (2001).  A similar
bill passed in the House.  H. Amdt. 31 to Foreign Relations Authorization Act, H.R.
1646, 107 Cong. (2001).  Ultimately, however, in 2002 the third version of the Ameri-
can Servicemembers’ Protection Act passed as an amendment to the 2002 Supple-
mental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response to Terrorist
Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206 (codified as 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7432
(2002)).  Additionally, bills were proposed recommending that the United States’ sig-
nature be withdrawn from the Rome Statute and that all support be withheld from
participating in the ICC. See American Servicemember and Citizen Protection Act of
2002, H.R. 4169, 107th Cong. (2002); Presidential Order Limitation Act of 2001, H.R.
Con. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001); H. Amdt. 408, 107th Cong. (2002) to Bob Stump
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, H.R. 4546, 107th Cong.
(2002). The Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77 (to be codified as 16 U.S.C.
1856), § 630, 115 Stat. 748, 805 (2001), successfully passed and provides that no
United States funds will go to the International Criminal Court or the Preparatory
Commission.
72 Sadat & Carden, supra note 39, at 448.
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The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which
the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person
of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for
the surrender.73
Accordingly, this provision precludes the jurisdiction of the Court
over foreign nationals in a territory if their surrender would violate
existing treaties between the two states, unless the rights under
those treaties were waived.  The reference to “international agree-
ments” in the Article has been interpreted both narrowly and
broadly to include or exclude different types of agreements.74  The
narrow interpretation argues that the use of the term “sending
73 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 98(2).  It should be noted that the statute uses
the term “may” instead of “shall” when conceding superior jurisdiction to existing
international agreements, which arguably suggests discretionary rather than
mandatory adherence to this provision, but its use as a negative (i.e., “may not”) pre-
cludes the term’s discretionary application.  Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties requires that the “ordinary meaning” be applied in the statu-
tory construction of treaties.  1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
The ordinary meaning of “may not” is one of unqualified prohibition without allow-
ance for discretion and is therefore indistinguishable from “shall not” or “must not.”
In the Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, the issue of a state’s responsibility concerning surrender, transfer,
and extradition of suspects is discussed in Article 87.  In that report, the drafters rec-
ommended that a “State Party may deny a request for [surrender] [transfer] [extradi-
tion] only if: (e) compliance with the request would put it in breach of an existing
obligation that arises from [a peremptory norm of] general international law [treaty]
obligation undertaken to another state.” Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Apr. 14, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1, at 134.  Therefore, the final version of the Rome Statute
states that the Court “may not” request the transfer of persons if it would require the
requested state to act inconsistently with pre-existing treaties, and the Preparatory
Committee report states that a State Party “may deny” the Court’s request, thus stating
the rule both positively and negatively.  Id. On the other hand, the report notes that
“the options in this subparagraph are not clear” and that “there is no agreement on
the list of grounds contained in this option.” Id. at n.13.  Subsequently, the report
suggests tension between the discretionary prioritization of requesting states and the
Court by stating “a State Party [shall] [may] accord priority to a request of a state over
a request by the Court for the extradition, transfer or surrender of a person to the
requesting state under the provisions of any existing bilateral or multilateral agree-
ment,” but this only modifies the discretion of the state and does not address the
authority of the Court to proceed with a request. Id. at 136.  Rather than illuminating
the intent of the drafters, the notes of the Preparatory Committee raise more ques-
tions than answers and reaffirm recourse to the plain language construction, which
leads to the conclusion that there is no difference between “may not” and “shall not.”
74 For a complete discussion of this distinction, see generally, Crawford et al., supra
note 11.
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state” modifies the scope of the provision75 and limits its applicabil-
ity to agreements involving nationals sent to the foreign territory by
their governments, such as U.S. military personnel sent abroad.
The broad interpretation, championed by the U.S., provides a
more pervasive deference and makes no distinction between na-
tionals being sent by the government or not.  This interpretation
also allows for the subsequent negotiation of treaties limiting the
Court’s jurisdiction.76  Mr. Scheffer asserted that “[w]hen the U.S.
delegation successfully negotiated the inclusion of Article 98(2) in
the Rome Treaty, we had in mind our own SOFAs [“Status of
Forces Agreements”] and their applicability.”77  This concern
about SOFAs (an agreement “between the United States and a host
nation which establishes uniform rules for handling legal matters
involving U.S. military personnel serving overseas”78) was modified
by Mr. Scheffer’s additional observations: “Perhaps more impor-
tantly, even as a non-party, under Article 98(2) we can negotiate
agreements with other governments that would prevent any Ameri-
can [sic] being surrendered to the ICC from their respective juris-
dictions without our consent.”79
From Mr. Scheffer’s representations, it is apparent that the
United States came to Rome with the intent to exempt its citizens
from liability to the Court80 and proceeded to negotiate for this
during the Conference.  Failing to acquire universal exemption or
veto authority, the U.S. delegation managed to negotiate a provi-
sion in the Statute providing a failsafe whereby it could individually
negotiate with State parties to the Conference achieving the same
result.  This provision was Article 98(2).
At the Conference in Rome there were many concessions
made to the U.S. delegation.81  Indeed, these concessions began
prior to the Conference pursuant to U.N. resolution 50/46 of De-
cember 11, 1995, which established a committee preparatory to the
75 Id. at para. 43.
76 “The United States takes the view that these [bilateral] agreements are ‘ex-
pressly contemplated’ by Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute.” Id. at para. 10, citing a
statement made by Ambassador Negroponte, United States Permanent Representa-
tive to the U.N., July 12, 2002 (subsequently U.S. Ambassador to Iraq).
77 Scheffer, supra note 38, at 17.
78 Erik Rosenfeld, Application of U.S. Status of Forces Agreements to Article 98 of the
Rome Statute, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV., 273, 276 n.30 (2003).
79 Scheffer, supra note 38, at 18.
80 Id.
81 There was some concern that the delegates had gone too far to accommodate
the United States in making concessions and that the final result would be a statute so
loosely formulated that major human rights violators would evade prosecution. See
Chibueze, supra note 1, at 52-53.
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formation of the International Criminal Court.  At the Conference,
the concessions included the incorporation of the doctrine of com-
plementarity, affording the ICC jurisdiction only if national courts
are unable or unwilling to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute,
and the exemption for the prosecution of war crimes for seven
years (the U.S. was negotiating for ten years).  However, the United
States failed to win support for its amendments to the statute to
achieve exemption for U.S. citizens or, alternatively, exclusive U.N.
Security Council authority for prosecutions.82  Other amendments
proffered by the U.S. delegation were overwhelmingly voted down
in the closing hours of the Conference.83  In the concluding mo-
ments of the Conference “[a]s delegates clapped, cheered, hugged
and took snapshots to commemorate the moment, dejected mem-
bers of the United States delegation sat stonily in their seats.”84  Of
160 nations present, 120 countries voted for the Rome Statute, 7
voted against it,85 and 21 abstained.
Shortly after its passage, the Rome Statute was ratified by 89
countries (ratification currently stands at ninety-seven states).  The
U.S. reaction was, at first, benign.  Then-President Clinton pro-
vided a qualified endorsement by signing the Treaty in his last days
in office without necessary Congressional authorization.86  Subse-
quently, the succeeding administration sent a letter to the U.N. de-
82 The requirement of U.N. Security Council approval for all ICC prosecutions
would provide the United States, as a permanent member, with the capability of veto-
ing any unwanted prosecutions, and would therefore be analogous to the ICTY.
83 See Lawrence Weschler, Exceptional Cases in Rome: The United States and the Struggle
for an ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 85-111 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).
84 Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Dissents, but Accord is Reached on War-Crime Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 1998, at A3.
85 The United States was among the only democracies to vote against the statute
and was joined by Libya, Israel, Qatar, Yemen, Algeria, and China.  Among the ab-
staining countries were India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Cuba, North Korea,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.  Faulhaber, supra note 46, at 538.  Collectively, these na-
tions have among the worst human rights records (Id. at 538 n.15) on the globe,
leading some to believe that if there is any truth to the adage that one is judged by the
company one keeps, then the United States will be judged harshly.
86 President Clinton also left a recommendation to his successor not to endorse
the Treaty as drafted because it contained flaws.  However, his approach suggested a
willingness to further work with the ICC in order to forge a document that could be
mutually agreeable.  President Clinton’s actions reflected a desire to reform the treaty
and remain in the debate.  This position is espoused by David Scheffer, Clinton’s
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, who concluded that the remaining flaws
in the treaty could be best resolved if the United States were a signatory.  Scheffer also
eschewed “[d]eclaring war on the treaty or just monitoring further talks with studied
indifference, which appears to be the Bush Administration’s chosen course.”  Schef-
fer, supra note 38, at 5.
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claring its intent not to ratify the Rome Statute87and seemingly
began a campaign to circumvent its implementation.  The Lawyer’s
Committee for Human Rights (now called Human Rights First)
concluded that “[d]espite President Clinton having signed the
Rome Treaty, giving the Court his qualified support, the U.S. has
now completely disengaged from the ICC.  This disengagement
was signaled powerfully in May this year [2002] by the U.S.’s ‘un-
signing’ of the Rome Statute.”88
On May 17, 2002, the U.S. threatened to veto the Security
Council renewal of the East Timor peacekeeping mission if U.S.
soldiers were not given immunity from ICC prosecutions, but then
relented temporarily.89  The Rome Treaty was to take effect on July
1, 2002.90  On June 21, 2002, just 10 days before the effective date
of the Statute, the U.S. threatened to veto a renewal of the
peacekeeping mission to Bosnia,91 absent its sought-after immunity
87 The U.S. declaration not only served to disengage the U.S. symbolically from
the jurisdiction of the Court, but also served to symbolically circumvent any proposed
U.S. obligations in accordance with Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Laws
of Treaties.  Article 18 states that “A state is obliged to refrain from acts that would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when (a) it has signed the treaty or has
exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.”
Vienna Convention, supra note 73, art. 18 (emphasis added).  Once the Bush adminis-
tration made its intentions clear by virtue of the declaration, the U.S. was no longer
subject to criticism for failing to abide by Article 18 and for defeating the object and
purpose of the ICC treaty.
88 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Article 98 Agreements: The EU’s Guiding
Principles in Context, at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_justice/icc/us
_role/us_role_01.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2004) [hereinafter LCHR, Article 98].
89 The U.S. attempted to amend the Security Council’s resolution calling for a
peacekeeping mission in East Timor in order to exempt U.N. troops from prosecu-
tion by the ICC, but “dropped the amendment in the face of strong opposition from
other council members – including Britain and France which both have veto power in
the council and support the court.”  Subsequently, U.S. Ambassador John Negro-
ponte stated on May 20th,  “We definitely want to make clear that when we participate
in peacekeeping missions that we intend to seek some kind of exception to interna-
tional criminal court jurisdiction.”  Edith M. Lederer, U.S. Makes Int’l Court Demands,
Associated Press, May 20, 2002, available at http://www.globalsolutions.org/pro-
grams/law_justice/icc/icc_home.html. See Colum Lynch, U.S. Seeks Court Immunity for
E. Timor Peacekeepers, WASH. POST, May 16, 2002, at A22; Somini Segupta, U.S. Fails in
UN to Exempt Peacekeepers from New Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2002, cited in The Wash-
ington Working Group on the ICC: US Fails to Win Exemption; East Timor Peacekeeping
Will Continue (May 17 2002), available at http://www.globalsolutions.org/programs/
law_justice/icc/icc_home.html.
90 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 126.
91 As reported in the New York Times, Richard S. Williamson, the United States
representative to the United Nations for special political affairs stated, “In the Secur-
ity Council this morning, I said there should be no misunderstanding that if there is
not adequate protection for U.S. peacekeepers, there will be no U.S. peacekeepers.”
Serge Schmemann, U.S. Links Peacekeeping to Immunity From New Court, N.Y. TIMES,
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from the ICC,92 but agreed to a 10-day extension.  Thereafter, on
June 30, 2002 the U.S. vetoed an extension of the peacekeeping
mission in Bosnia in a U.N. Security Council vote of 13 to one.93
This action prompted U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to de-
clare that the world could not afford the Security Council’s deep
divide on such important issues and the implications it may have
on all U.N. peace operations.94  Three days later the U.S. agreed to
another extension to allow for reconsideration of the issue.95
Numerous states weighed in on the issue, with the overwhelm-
ing majority against the U.S. position, and raised such concerns as
whether the Security Council has the authority to adopt resolutions
that circumvent treaties which are in compliance with the United
Nations Charter; whether the exemptions backed by the U.N.
would be in violation of the U.N. Charter according to Chapter
VII; what the impact of these exemptions on customary interna-
June 19, 2002, at A3. See Anwar Iqbal, U.S. Seeks Amnesty for Peacekeepers, UNITED PRESS
INT’L, June 20, 2002, available at http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/unsc1422/upi
062002.html; Carola Hoyos, US Seeks to Exempt Peacekeepers from International Criminal
Court, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 2002 (The Americas), at 9, available at http://www.global-
solutions.org/programs/law_justice/icc/icc_home.html; US Threat to Pull Troops; Row
over New UN Court, HERALD SUN, June 21, 2002, at 33, available at http://www.global-
solutions.org/programs/law_justice/icc/icc_home.html.
92 The proposed text of the U.S. draft resolution for inclusion in the renewal of
the U.N. Security Council Bosnia Peacekeeping Mandate states, in relevant part, “that
persons from contributing states acting in connection with such operations shall en-
joy in the territory of all member states, other than the contributing states, immunity
from arrest, detention and prosecution with respect to all acts arising out of the oper-
ation and that this immunity shall continue after the termination of their participa-
tion in the operation for all such acts.” Reported Text Submitted by U.S. to be Included in
the Renewal of the U.N. Security Council, Bosnia Peacekeeping Mandate, June 19, 2002, cited
in The Washington Working Group on the I.C.C.: U.S. Efforts to Obtain Exemption for U.N.
Peacekeepers Draft Security Council Resolution, at www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/unsc1422/
UNSCdraftres.html (June 21, 2002).
93 Ambassador Negroponte stated that the United States was committed to Bosnia,
but “[t]he fact that we are vetoing this resolution in the face of that commitment,
however, is an indication of just how serious our concerns remain about the risks to
our peacekeepers.”  Colum Lynch, U.S. Wields Veto in Clash Over War Crimes Court,
WASH. POST, July 1, 2002, at A1, available at http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/
unsc1422/wp-veto.html. See Betsy Pisik, U.S. Ready to Pull Troops Out of Bosnia; No Deal
Reached Over World Court, WASH. TIMES, June 29, 2002, at A5; United Press Interna-
tional, US OKs 72-hr Extension for Bosnia Mission, wire service (June 30, 2002), at
http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/unsc1422/upi-extend.html.
94 U.N. Press Release, World Cannot Afford Security Council’s Deep Divide on
Such Important Issue, Says Secretary-General, on Failure to Extend Bosnia Mission,
Jan. 7, 2002, SG/SM/295 SC/7440, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/
sgsm8295.doc.htm (last visited May 1, 2005).
95 Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court, U.S. Agrees to
Temporary Extension of Peacekeeping, at http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/unsc1422/
july3.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2004).
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tional law might be; and what corresponding message such resolu-
tions send out (i.e., that peacekeepers are above the law).96  On
July 12, 2002 the Security Council succumbed to the relentless U.S.
pressure and approved a one-year exemption for U.S.
peacekeepers, shielding them from the jurisdiction of the ICC.97
This compromise was widely regarded with bitterness from Se-
curity Council members.  The U.N. representative from Mexico
stated, “The general opinion of the international community is
96 Don Mackay, the U.N. Security Council representative from New Zealand,
stated that the issue before the Council had implications for peacekeeping, funda-
mental issues of international law, the international treaty-making process, and the
role of the Council itself, and that there was no justification or need for the exemp-
tion of peacekeepers which would “seem to enshrine an unconscionable double stan-
dard, placing peacekeepers above the law.”  U.N. Press Release: Bosnia, supra note 65.
The representative from Canada, Paul Heinbecker, stated that fundamental princi-
ples of international law were in question and that the circulated resolution con-
tained elements that exceeded the Council’s mandate. Id. Stefan Tafrov,
representative from Bulgaria, articulated that peacekeeping missions were vital to the
U.N. and the Council and that Chapter VII of the U.N.  Charter should not be linked
to the weakening of any international treaty. Id. Maria Elena Chassoul, representa-
tive from Costa Rica speaking on behalf of the Rio group stated that the resolution
exceeded the Council’s authority and might undermine its creditability and legiti-
macy. Id. The representative from Jordan, Zeid Ra’ad Zeid al-Hussein, stated that the
only discussion the Security Council should be having a week after the ICC statute
entered into force was on how best to assist the Court, to contemplate anything short
of that would be offering comfort to the criminals of tomorrow, and that the resolu-
tion would edge beyond the Council’s authority under the United Nations Charter.
Id.
97 The authority for the exemption of peacekeepers from potential prosecution is
grounded in Article 16 of the Rome Statute which states, “No investigation or prose-
cution may be commenced or proceeded with under the Statute for a period of 12
months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request
may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.”  Rome Statute, supra
note 13, art. 16.  This authority was contested by many of the representatives to the
Security Council during and immediately after the vote on Resolution 1422 authoriz-
ing the exemption.  U.N. Press Release: Bosnia, supra note 65.  They contended that
Article 16 of the Rome Statute was not meant to apply blanket coverage before the
fact but to be determined on an ad hoc basis, and that the United States’ interpreta-
tion unreasonably expanded the Security Council’s authority by limiting targets of
ICC prosecution. Id. Claudia Fritsche, of Liechtenstein, argued that the approach
contemplated would effectively amend Article 16 of the Rome Statute, and Brazil’s
representative, Gelson Fonseca, stated that the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome
Statute were applicable only on a case-by-case basis. Id. These critiques suggest that
the applicability of Article 16 must be observed in a historical/specific manner and
not in a preemptive/generic context.  Some representatives, including Adolfo Aguiler
Zinser of Mexico, cautioned that the Council’s broad interpretation of Article 16,
presupposed by Resolution 1422, created a dangerous precedent of using its resolu-
tions to amend treaties in contravention of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, and suspension [of liability] could not be granted concerning events that
had not occurred, nor could such a suspension be unlimited. Id.
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that this is wrong.”98  The representative from Canada commented,
“This is a sad day for the United Nations,”99 and the representative
from South Africa declared that the actions of the United States
held disturbing implications for the rest of the member states, and
the world in general.100  The result was (a renewable) Resolution
1422 which states in relevant part:
if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel
from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over
acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or au-
thorized operation, [the ICC] shall for a twelve-month period
starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation
or prosecution.
Thus, all U.N. peacekeepers from any countries that are not parties
to the Rome Statute are not subject to ICC prosecutions for at least
one year.
In June 2003 the exemption was extended for another year
under U.S. pressure.101  However, under subsequent domestic and
international political pressure, in June of 2004 the United States
withdrew its proposed resolution to further renew the immunity
for the peacekeepers.102  In a press release dated June 23, 2004,
Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Deputy U.S. Representative to
the United Nations stated, “We believe the draft and its predeces-
sors fairly meet the concerns of all.  Not all Council Members
agree, however, and the United States has decided not to proceed
with further consideration and action on the draft at this time to
avoid a prolonged and divisive debate.”103  This sensitivity to the
concerns of other Council Members reflects a decisive change
from those considerations espoused by the administration two
years earlier when it stood alone in the Security Council on Resolu-
tion 1422 and vetoed renewal of peacekeeping in Bosnia.
Contemporaneous with the diplomatic efforts taking place in
the U.N. Security Council was the domestic debate in the U.S.  leg-
98 Washington Working Group on the International Criminal Court, UN Security
Council Grants One-Year Exemption for Peacekeepers (July 12, 2002), at http://www.wfa.
org/issues/wicc/unsc1422/july12.html.
99 Id.
100 U.N. Press Release: Bosnia, supra note 65.
101 See S.C. Res. 1487, UN SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S-INF/59
(2003), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/394/51/
PDF/N0339451.pdf?OpenElement. See also Jim Lobe, U.S. Slashes Military Aid to
Friendly Nations (Oct. 1, 2003), at http://us.oneworld.net/article/view/69348/1.
102 Press Release, Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Remarks on the Interna-
tional Criminal Court , at http://www.un.int/usa/04print_111.htm (June 23, 2004)
[hereinafter Cunningham].
103 Id.
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islature regarding the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of
2002 (ASPA).  This legislative attack on the Court was passed and
signed into law on August 2, 2002, just 21 days after the compro-
mise was reached on Resolution 1422.  ASPA precludes United
States’ participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities unless one of
the following conditions exists: U.S. soldiers are expressly exempt
from ICC jurisdiction by U.N. resolution; the countries in which
the troops are operating are outside the jurisdiction of the ICC; the
troops are in countries that have concluded bilateral agreements
with the U.S. exempting them under Article 98(2) of the Rome
Statute; or the national interests of the U.S. justify participation.104
ASPA also prohibits U.S. cooperation with the International
Criminal Court by such parties as the United States Courts, or local
governments, and United States agencies.  It prohibits any federal,
state, or local government from providing support to the ICC; pro-
hibits the extradition of any person to the ICC; prohibits the use of
United States funds to assist in the investigation, arrest, detention,
or prosecution of any United States citizen by the ICC; and prohib-
its any investigative activity of the ICC in the United States and its
territory.105
This Act further prohibits the transfer of any classified na-
tional security information and law enforcement information to
the ICC.106  ASPA expressly grants the President authority “to use
all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release” of
persons of the Armed Forces of the United States and certain other
persons being detained or imprisoned by or on behalf of the Inter-
national Criminal Court.107  The fear that the United States may
use force to protect its soldiers if prosecuted at the Hague inspired
ASPA’s nickname, “The Hague Invasion Act.”108  The authority af-
forded under this Section extends its protection beyond United
States military personnel to include other individuals, even non-
Americans.109  The exact extent of the protection and who is cov-
104 American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA), Pub. L. No. 107-206,
§ 2005, 116 Stat. 899, 903-904 [hereinafter ASPA].
105 Id. at § 2004.
106 Id. at § 2006.
107 Id. at § 2008.
108 See Faulhaber, supra note 46, at 546 n.77 (citing The Hague Invasion Act, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 2001, at B6).
109 ASPA, supra note 104, § 2008.  Section 2008(b) of the American Service-
members’ Protection Act states, “Persons authorized to be freed –the authority of
subsection (a) shall extend to the following persons:  (1) Covered United States per-
sons; (2) Covered allied persons; (3) Individuals detained or imprisoned for official
actions taken while the individual was a covered United States person or a covered
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ered under the Law is unclear but the administration is clearly as-
suming an expansive interpretation.  Regarding this protection,
Undersecretary Bolton opined,
This broad scope of coverage is essential to ensuring that the
ICC will not become an impediment to U.S. activities around
the world.  We must guarantee the necessary protection to our
media, delegations of public and private individuals traveling to
international meetings, private individuals accompanying offi-
cial personnel, contractors working along side official personnel
(particularly in the military context), participants in exchange
programs, former governmental officials, arms control inspec-
tors, people engaged in commerce and business abroad, stu-
dents in government sponsored programs, to name just a few
categories of persons.110
Additionally, ASPA bars all U.S. military assistance to states
who are members of the ICC and allows exceptions only for certain
countries (including NATO members), where it is in the U.S. na-
tional interest to continue military aid and who have executed an
Article 98 treaty.111  These provisions make up some of the sections
with the greatest bearing on the ICC.
Thus, the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002
mandates the restriction of legitimate peacekeeping forces;112 the
obstruction of the ICC in its investigatory capacity in the U.S.113
(regardless of the gravity of the offenses investigated); the refusal
to share any classified national security or law enforcement infor-
mation114 whether or not it concerns Americans and/or involves
matters relating to U.S. territory; the deprivation of military aid to
State parties to the ICC that have been traditional U.S. allies unless
they endorse Article 98 of the Rome Statute;115 and the authority of
the president to “use all means necessary” to remove specific U.S.
and allied personnel from detention by the ICC.116
The Netherlands, host State of the ICC, apparently has noth-
ing to fear however, as a U.S. Embassy communication dated June
12, 2002 reassured that, “we would expect to resolve these contro-
versies in a constructive manner . . .  [and] we cannot envisage
allied person, and in the case of a covered allied person, upon the request of such
government.” Id.
110 Bolton, Remarks at AEI, supra note 68.
111 ASPA, supra note 104, § 2007.
112 Id. at § 2005.
113 Id. at § 2004.
114 Id. at § 2006.
115 Id. at § 2007.
116 Id. at § 2008.
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circumstances under which the United States would need to resort
to military action against the Netherlands or another ally.”117  De-
spite its language, the statement itself could be construed as an
implicit threat to the U.S.’s traditional allies, and the otherwise ri-
diculous notion of attacking The Hague may not be as far-fetched
as conventional wisdom might suggest.  In any event, the fact that
the U.S. Department of State found it necessary to clarify this point
is troubling.
The steps taken by ASPA not only attempt to remove the
Court’s jurisdiction over U.S. servicepersons, ASPA’s purported
purpose, but are clearly designed to stymie the Court’s ability to
function.  Prohibiting cooperation with law enforcement regarding
all matters does not serve to protect servicepersons per se, nor does
the refusal to allow investigation on U.S. territory.  Cooperation
with law enforcement is essential for competent prosecution as is
the sharing of information—particularly in cases that cross state
boundaries.  The drafting of the ASPA statute overreaches the pro-
tection it seeks to afford and could be rationally limited to denial
of cooperation in cases involving U.S. servicepersons or citizens
only.  Instead the drafters’ intent is manifest in its breadth—to
eliminate the ICC.118
This conclusion is consistent with the public statements of sev-
eral U.S. government spokespersons and representatives.119  Am-
117 The International Criminal Court & Reaction to the American Servicemembers’ Protection
Act, Statement of the US Embassy (June 12, 2002), available at http://www.usemb.nl/
061202.htm.
118 This goal is reflected in public statements made by Undersecretary Bolton who
has repeatedly maintained a “no compromise” position on the International Criminal
Court and stated, “Specifically, I propose for the United States policy . . . no financial
support, directly or indirectly; no collaboration; and no further negotiations with
other governments to improve the statute.  This approach is likely to maximize the
chances that the ICC will wither and collapse, which should be our objective.” Is a
U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. Interest?: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 28-31 (1998)
(statement of Hon. John Bolton, Former Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs; Senior Vice President, American Enterprise Institute, Washing-
ton, D.C.), quoted in Sadat, supra note 1, at 590.
119 Indeed, the feared vulnerability to the ICC seems to represent a dominate
theme in U.S. foreign policy, as seen in this U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions report:
COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVEN-
TION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD ON THE SALE OF CHILDREN, CHILD
PROSTITUTION AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD ON THE INVOLVE-
MENT OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT, S. REP. NO. 107-4 (2002). In
that report, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations made spe-
cific determinations concerning the impact a U.S. ratification of the
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bassador Lawrence G. Rossin stated that the International Criminal
Court is “an organization that we believe is flawed, discriminatory
and weakens established norms of international law.”120  In a
speech delivered by Charge’ d’ Affaires Douglas A. Davidson on
May 16, 2002 to the Permanent Council in Vienna he stated that
“[t]here is only one United States position on the International
Criminal Court Treaty.  It is simple and it is this: we are opposed to
it.”121
2. Article 98 Treaties and Military Aid
Undeniably, the most effective weapons in the United States’
arsenal to circumvent the ICC are the Article 98 treaties.  Article 98
treaties refer to Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute and are purport-
edly designed to provide protection to United States personnel.
“Dubbed ‘impunity agreements’ by leading legal experts, these bi-
lateral agreements, if signed, would provide that neither party to
the accord would bring the other’s current or former government
officials, military or other personnel (regardless of whether or not
they are nationals of the state concerned) before the jurisdiction of
the Court.”122  Initially, the United States’ success with the Article
98 treaties was modest.  By fall of 2002, the United States had con-
vinced only 13 States to enter into bilateral agreements.123
However, a year later the number of countries that were signa-
tories soared to 70.  According to a speech made by John R. Bolton
to the American Enterprise Institute, 70 countries had signed Arti-
cle 98 agreements with 50 of them being signatories to the Rome
Statute.124  These numbers are refuted, however, in a letter to for-
Optional Protocol on the Convention on the Rights of the Child would
have regarding the applicability of ICC jurisdiction (finding that ratifi-
cation does not establish “a basis for jurisdiction by any international
tribunal, including the International Criminal Court”). Id. at 17.  Only
after determining that ratification would not subject the U.S. to ICC
jurisdiction would the Committee recommend conditional approval of
the Optional Protocol. See id. at 36.
120 Letter from Ambassador Lawrence G. Rossin, Article 98-The American Perspec-
tive, to Zagreb Press (May 2003) (on file with the New York City Law Review).
121 Charge d’ Affaires Douglas Davidson, United States Mission to the OSCE State-
ment on the International Criminal Court, Remarks delivered by Charge d’ Affaires
Douglas A. Davidson to the Permanent Council, Vienna, at http://www.usosce.rpo.at/
archive/2002/05/16icc.htm (May 16, 2002).
122 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, US Bilateral Immunity or So-called
“Article 98” Agreements available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2003/
0606usbilaterals.htm (Apr. 18, 2003) [hereinafter CICC, Bilateral Immunity].
123 See LCHR, Article 98, supra note 88.
124 Bolton, Remarks at AEI, supra note 68.
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mer Secretary of State Colin Powell from Human Rights Watch
dated December 9, 2003, urging Powell to ignore the statement of
some U.S. public officials, and asserting that only one-third of ICC
states have signed Article 98 agreements (out of 92 state parties).125
Human Rights Watch further avers that less than 20 (total) have
entered into force and that only nine of those are ICC states.126
Given the confidential nature of these agreements, it is difficult to
determine the exact number of signatories, however, in a press re-
lease dated July 21, 2003, there were 48 publicly identified
signers.127
One reason the United States has recently enjoyed success
with Article 98 treaties is its threat to withhold military aid to virtu-
ally all nations who are signatories to the Rome Statute.  According
to Section 2007 of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act,
military aid is cut from states that are party to the Rome Statute
(with some exceptions) unless they have executed Article 98 trea-
ties.128  This provision did not come into effect until July 1, 2003
(one year after the Rome Statute’s passage) and the rise in Article
98 treaty ratifications corresponds to the proximity of the effective
date of this statute.
Of all the categories in United States foreign aid, the largest
portion is earmarked for military aid,129 which accounts for almost
30% of all U.S. budgeted aid funds (excluding supplemental
funds).130  This aid principally consists of loans and grants to for-
eign governments for the purchase of military equipment from the
United States and, to a lesser degree, for training foreign military
officers and personnel.131  Military aid is an important component
of United States’ diplomatic efforts and has been described as “the
best way to win friends and influence people around the globe.”132
125 Human Rights Watch, US and the ICC: Extend Article 98 Agreement Waivers, Letter to
US Secretary of State Colin Powell, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/12/US12
0903-ltr.htm (Dec. 9, 2003).
126 Id.
127 Announcement, Embassy of the United States of America, Croatia, Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) Article 98 Agreement Signatory Countries, at http://
www.usembassy.hr/issues/030722.htm (July 21, 2003).
128 ASPA, supra note 104, § 2007.
129 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: FOREIGN OPERA-
TIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at vii (released Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/17779.pdf.
130 Id.
131 U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID IN DEVELOPMENT 7-8
(May 1997), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=8&sequence=3.
132 Kathy Kiely, Importance of Foreign Aid is Hitting Home, USA TODAY, Dec. 4, 2001, at
A11.
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In this light, the denial of the largest component of U.S. aid based
solely on the issue of membership in the ICC reveals an unprece-
dented hostility.  According to Heather Hamilton of the World
Federalist Association (WFA), “This is the first sanction in U.S. dip-
lomatic history targeted exclusively at democracies.”133  In the
Commentary section of the Washington Post, activist Tom Mali-
nowski stated that “[t]his may be the only sanction in American
diplomatic history aimed almost exclusively at governments that
share American values.”134
Of the publicly disclosed signatories to the Article 98 treaties,
the majority are from poor, developing nations in Africa and Asia
(and most are also non-ICC members).  According to the Coalition
for the International Criminal Court:
A number of countries have reportedly received large sums of
U.S. financial assistance upon signature of the bilateral immu-
nity agreements.  In the case of Sierra Leone, upon signature of
a bilateral immunity agreement it was announced that the U.S.
would invest $25 million in the Sierra Rutile mines.  In other
instances, pressure for signature of a bilateral immunity agree-
ment has included threats such as restricted accession to NATO,
as has been reported in some of the Balkan states, and the with-
drawal of ‘dual use’ funding, such as in the case of the Bahamas,
where American Ambassador J. Richard Blankenship warned on
public television that an ‘unfavorable’ response could result in
the loss of funding for the paving and lighting of an airport
runway.135
The developing nations are particularly vulnerable to this type of
pressure, as the amounts of foreign aid have increased dramatically
in the aftermath of 9/11 in support of the U.S. administration’s
“war on terrorism.”
In spite of the single-mindedness of the assault on the Court
by this administration, unprecedented sanctions of democratic
states, political exploitation of under-developed nations and the in-
ternational resentment this approach has fostered, administration
officials proffer that they are not employing undue coercion.  In
response to a question inquiring whether the U.S. was using mili-
tary aid as a weapon to force nations to sign Article 98 treaties,
133 Lobe, supra note 101.
134 Tom Malinowski, Bush’s Court Crusade, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2002, at A25.
135 Press Release, Coalition for the International Criminal Court, U.S. Threatens to
Cut Military Assistance to Nations Supporting the International Criminal Court: Law
Pressures Non-U.S. Allies to Sign ICC Immunity Pacts, at http://www.iccnow.org./
pressroom/ciccmediastatements/2003/06.30.03ASPAdeadline.pdf  (June 30, 2003)
[hereinafter CICC Press Release].
2005] WAR ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 31
then-Secretary of State Colin Powell replied, “[W]e’re not
bludgeoning or threatening any of our friends. . . . Article 98 is a
way of dealing with those [ICC] concerns, and I hope that all of
our friends and allies will view Article 98 as a positive, constructive
way of dealing with those concerns.”136  In a Department of De-
fense news release dated May 6, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld stated, “there maybe [sic] mechanisms within the treaty
by which we can work bilaterally with friends and allies, to the ex-
tent they are willing, to prevent the jurisdiction of the treaty.”137
Subsequently, Secretary Bolton claimed that “[t]he U.S. deci-
sion to seek these bilateral agreements originated during the open
debate in the U.N. Security Council on Resolution 1422.”138  He
indicated that the U.S. was encouraged to use individual bilateral
agreements by member states of the European Union, and
“[f]ollowing this advice from our European friends, we began in
the late summer of 2002 to seek Article 98 agreements.”139  These
disingenuous assertions were made in spite of Secretary Rumsfeld’s
prior reference to bilateral remedies and (prior) statements by the
head of the U.S. delegation to Rome, David Scheffer, who specifi-
cally asserted that the primary reason for the U.S. negotiation of
Article 98 treaties was to subsequently enter bilateral immunity
agreements.140
Ambassador Lawrence G. Rossin stated that the U.S. was not
“blackmailing Croatia” while urging them to sign a bilateral immu-
nity agreement and simultaneously threatening them with the re-
moval of military assistance if they refused.141  This would mean
that Croatia would lose nineteen million dollars in military equip-
136 Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Powell, New Spanish Foreign Minister
on Iraq, International Criminal Court: Remarks after Ana Palacio’s courtesy call on
US Secretary of State, at http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2003/Oct/15-441853.
html (Aug. 13, 2002).
137 News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC
Treaty, at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2002/b05062002_bt233-02.html
(May 6, 2002).
138 Bolton, Remarks at AEI, supra note 68.
139 Id.  Far from being a friendly suggestion by the EU, the heavy-handed intimida-
tion tactics employed by the administration have caused considerable discord be-
tween European-American relations, “European Union countries have been ‘warned’
by U.S. officials to cease lobbying Eastern European countries not to sign individual
pacts, declaring that lobbying against the signature of Article 98 agreements would be
considered ‘unfriendly’ and ‘very damaging’ to U.S.–E.U. relations.”  Sadat, supra
note 1, at 559-60 (quoting Brian Knowlton & Thomas Fuller, U.S. Says It Will Cut Aid If
Countries Fight Pacts: Deals Support Exception from Court, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, June 11,
2003, at 1).
140 Scheffer, supra note 38, at 17.
141 Rossin, supra note 120.
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ment and training assistance, and Rossin admitted, such assistance
would “help[ ] prepare the Croatian Armed Forces for NATO
membership.”142  Rossin also stated that “[b]oth the U.S. and the
European Union agree that non-surrender agreements are consis-
tent with [Article 98 of] the Rome Statute . . . that created the
International Criminal Court.”143  Yet, according to the EU, the
U.S.-endorsed bilateral treaty violates Article 98 of the Rome Stat-
ute.144  Further, in June of 2003 the EU Presidency affirmed the
EU Common Position that rejected the bilateral immunity deals
offered by the U.S.145  The EU Counsel does maintain that non-
surrender agreements could be consistent with the ICC statute
under limited circumstances (e.g., assurance of investigation and,
where appropriate, prosecution, if the agreements only cover per-
sons who are not nationals of an ICC state party and only apply to
persons who are present on the territory of the requested state be-
cause they have been sent by a sending state), but the U.S. agree-
ments meet none of these requirements.146
In spite of the pressure applied to sign and ratify Article 98
treaties, many states and regional bodies have stood up to this U.S.
administration and refused to submit.  These nations include, inter
alia, all 15 nations of the European Union (and 10 Accession
states), Argentina, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Trinidad
and Tobago, Venezuela, Ecuador and several other African and
Latin American countries.  In an official press release dated July 7,
2003 the Brazilian government stated, “[Brazil has] taken cogni-
zance of the U.S. decision to cut off military aid to Brazil and some
50 other countries that are not prepared to sign a bilateral agree-
ment exempting United States citizens from prosecution by the In-
ternational Criminal Court” and “such an agreement runs counter
to the letter and spirit of the Rome Statute and constitutes a threat
to the judicial equality of States.”147  Furthermore, Brazil opined
that it was legally estopped from signing the Article 98 treaty be-
cause it “cannot bilaterally fail to comply with an obligation as-
sumed at a multilateral level.”148
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 CICC Press Release, supra note 135.
145 Id.
146 Crawford et al., supra note 11, at para. 14.
147 Press Release, Embassy of Brazil in London, Brazilian government press release
number 033/2003, US Military Aid and the International Criminal Court, available at
http://www.brazil.org.uk/page.php?cid=1606&offset=11 (Feb. 7, 2003).
148 Id.
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Brazil is not the only state to postulate that the Article 98 trea-
ties are in violation of international law.  Despite the erroneous as-
sertion made by Undersecretary Bolton, the European Union has
also maintained the position that these agreements are prohibited.
According to the Coalition for the International Criminal Court
(“CICC”), “States that sign these agreements would breach their
obligations under the Rome Statute, the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties and possibly their own extradition laws.”149
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
provides that “[a] state is obliged to refrain from acts, which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.”150  The object of the
Rome Statute is to avoid the impunity of perpetrators of crimes
which fall within the rubric of the Court’s jurisdiction.  “The over-
riding aim is thus not international prosecution as such, it is avoid-
ance of impunity.”151  The principle of complementarity supports
this aim as it allows for domestic prosecution and only takes juris-
diction in cases where states are unable or unwilling to prosecute,
but Article 98 Treaties thwart this purpose.  U.S.-proposed bilateral
immunity agreements “have been constituted solely for the pur-
pose of providing individuals or groups of individuals with immu-
nity from the ICC.  Furthermore, the agreements do not ensure
that the U.S. will investigate and, if necessary, prosecute alleged
crimes.  Therefore, the intent of these U.S. bilateral immunity
agreements is contrary to the overall purpose of the ICC.”152
On the other hand, when the Bush administration sent docu-
ments expressing its intent “not to become a party,”153 Article
18(a) of the Vienna Convention became operative and the U.S. was
no longer “obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the ob-
ject and purpose of [the] treaty.”154  Moreover, Article 18 does not
bind the U.S. as it has never ratified the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.  This does not, however, relieve other Rome Stat-
ute signatories of their obligations.  Those state signatories,
whether or not they have ratified, must still refrain from defeating
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute under Article 18 of the
Vienna Convention, and participation in bilateral immunity agree-
ments arguably defeats the object and purpose and therefore vio-
lates international law.
149 CICC, Bilateral Immunity, supra note 122.
150 Vienna Convention, supra note 73, at art. 18.
151 Crawford et al., supra note 11, at para. 26.
152 CICC, Bilateral Immunity, supra note 122.
153 Vienna Convention, supra note 73, at art. 18(a).
154 Id.
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Alternatively, advocates assert that the bilateral immunity
agreements are incompatible with Article 98 obligations.  This posi-
tion maintains that the purpose of Article 98 was to preclude the
circumvention of existing SOFA’s and contemplated a narrow ex-
ception predicated on the reason for the individual’s presence and
not his status.  Thus, foreign military personnel would fall under
Article 98 and not all persons of a particular nationality (who could
be in the foreign state for any reason).155  “Both the drafting his-
tory and the words of Article 98(2) indicate that the provision was
intended to cover SOFAs and like agreements.  Only this interpre-
tation is consistent with the principle of complementarity that un-
derlies the Rome Statute.”156
But the U.S. bilateral immunity agreements cover a “consider-
ably broader class of persons” and go “well beyond the scope of the
agreements envisaged by Article 98(2).”157  According to the CICC,
“[T]he U.S.-proposed bilateral immunity agreements seek immu-
nity for a wide-ranging class of persons, without any reference to
the traditional sending-state receiving-state relationship of SOFA
and SOMA agreements,” (the phrase “sending state” refers to a
state that is deploying troops).158  The CICC goes on to say:
This wide class of persons would include anyone found on the
territory of the state . . . who works or has worked for the U.S.
government.  Government legal experts have stated that this
could easily include non-Americans and even citizens of the
state in which they are found, effectively preventing that state
from taking responsibility for its own citizens.159
Additionally, Article 98 agreements could violate existing extradi-
tion treaties as they provide a narrower focus than traditional extra-
155 Crawford et al., supra note 11, at para. 43.
156 See LCHR, Article 98, supra note 88.
157 Crawford et al., supra note 11, at para. 44.
158 CICC, Bilateral Immunity, supra note 122.  For further discussion on the lan-
guage of Article 98(2) and the term “sending state,” see Amnesty Int’l, International
Criminal Court: U.S. Efforts to Obtain Impunity for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and
War Crimes (Sept. 2, 2002) (AI Index: IOR 40/025/2002), at http://web.amnesty.org/
library/index/engior400252002 (cited in Eubany, supra note 37, at 118).  As a term of
art, its use could not be inadvertent and the intent of the drafters to limit its applica-
tion to SOFA and like agreements is clear.  When applying the “ordinary meaning”
construction to Article 98 in light of the object and purpose of the treaty, in accor-
dance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, exemption under this
provision is only intended to apply to members of the armed forces under SOFA
agreements. Id.  See also Alisha D. Telci, The International Criminal Court: Is the United
States Overlooking an Easier Way to Hold Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden Accountable
for Their Actions?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 451, 478 (2004).
159 CICC, Bilateral Immunity, supra note 122.
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dition and surrender agreements.160  This is particularly relevant
when the United States is seeking to protect foreign nationals from
extradition to third-party states who are signatories to the Rome
Statute.
Furthermore, there are policy reasons against bilateral immu-
nity agreements.  These agreements create a dangerous precedent
whereby one set of rules would apply to U.S. citizens and another
to the citizens of the rest of the world.  The success of the U.S. in
ratifying Article 98 treaties also may encourage other states to seek
immunity for their own citizens and “would fundamentally under-
mine the Court.”161  Finally, it has been observed that Article 98(2)
was conceded by other delegates to Rome at the insistence of the
United States and these concessions were made with the under-
standing that the U.S. would remain involved in the ICC project,162
not take all available steps to render the Court impotent.
III. THE ADMINISTRATION’S MOTIVES
The International Criminal Court was established in order to
hold perpetrators of gross human rights violations accountable.  It
was designed to punish monsters parading as heads of state and to
deter other governmental officials from succumbing to savagery.
The ICC has not yet prosecuted its first case; however it announced
in June 2004 that its test case will involve the atrocities committed
in the Congo.163  Prior to that announcement, in a recent on-site
visit to the Congo, Dr. Iulia Motoc, the U.N. Special Rapporteur
for the Congo, found that the existence of the Court was having a
deterrent effect there, potentially resulting in fewer human rights
violations.164
Few international treaties have enjoyed the overwhelming plu-
ralistic groundswell of support that the Rome Statute received.
The ICC has been described as “the last great international institu-
tion of the Twentieth Century.”165  Yet, in the midst of the opti-
160 Id.
161 Human Rights Watch, United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal
Court, Legal Analysis of Immunity Agreements, at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/
docs/art98analysis.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
162 Id.
163 See Press Release No. ICC/OTP/2004.013-EN, Int’l Criminal Court: The Office
of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens its First Investigation
(June 23, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/26.html.
164 Iulia Motoc, U.N. Special Rapporteur for the Congo, Statements made during a
lecture at Saint Thomas University School of Law, Oct. 2003 (Author Present).
165 Sadat & Carden, supra note 39, at 385.  Secretary-General Kofi Annan hailed the
Rome Statute as “the hope of future generations,” and Committee Chairman Philippe
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mism that characterized the Court’s inception, the disapproval of
the United States foreshadowed difficulties to come.  Since the
Rome Conference, the U.S. has taken extraordinary measures to
circumvent the ICC.  It has taken the unprecedented step of “un-
signing” the treaty, which bore the signature of a previous U.S.
president.  It threatened to withhold essential peacekeeping troops
from East Timor and Bosnia.  The U.S. Congress passed the Ameri-
can Servicemembers’ Protection Act, which can only be viewed as
hostile to the Court and is clearly designed to eliminate the Court’s
effectiveness.  Most significantly, this administration has engaged
in a campaign of promoting bilateral immunity agreements, funda-
mentally circumventing the jurisdiction of the Court.  The imple-
mentation of these agreements is backed by one of the biggest
guns in the U.S. diplomatic arsenal: the threat of withholding mili-
tary aid.
These immunity agreements, viewed by many as prohibited
under international law, came about as a result of a premeditated
negotiation strategy at Rome designed to ensure that the U.S.
would retain absolute control over the Court or keep it from func-
tioning.  The current administration has indicated that it has taken
these steps in order to protect the U.S. military, but the military is
already exempt under existing SOFA’s, and the breadth of the cov-
erage included in the immunity agreements grossly contradicts this
assertion.  Such glaring contradictions and apparent single-mind-
edness of purpose lead the thoughtful observer to ponder alterna-
tive reasons that would lead a U.S. administration to institute
sanctions against exclusively democratic states, many of whom have
been traditional and close allies.
Despite the administration’s allegation that the anti-ICC policy
is grounded in the protection of U.S. military personnel, its actions
suggest that its motivations are to immunize and insulate U.S. gov-
ernment officials and other designees and U.S. foreign policy from
international oversight.  Inclusive in this protection is a policy pre-
cluding outside scrutiny of U.S. agenda matters, particularly eco-
nomic interests and the war on terrorism.  Section 2002(9) of
ASPA provides further evidence by stating,
[T]he Rome Statute creates a risk that the President and other
senior elected and appointed officials of the United States Gov-
ernment may be prosecuted by the International Criminal
Court.  Particularly if the Preparatory Commission agrees on a
Kirsch of Canada described the Statute’s passage as “humanity’s finest hour.”  Fer-
encz, supra note 43, at 229.
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definition of the Crime of Aggression over United States objec-
tions, senior United States officials may be at risk of criminal
prosecution for national security decisions involving such mat-
ters as responding to acts of terrorism, preventing the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction, and deterring
aggression.166
This Act specifically references current foreign policy initiatives
(e.g., the war on terrorism and the then-anticipated preemptive
strike on Iraq), which strongly suggests that protection for U.S. mil-
itary personnel is a pretext, particularly considering the protec-
tions already afforded under existing SOFA’s, and the
administration’s unquestioned acquiescence to the ICTY.167
Some attribute particularly nefarious motives to the current
administration’s war on the International Criminal Court and pos-
tulate that the Bush administration either anticipated the commis-
sion of atrocities in the name of its war on terrorism, or gave tacit
approval by turning a blind eye toward war crimes and other mas-
sive human rights violations committed by allies and subordi-
nates.168  Such foreseeable human rights violations include torture
166 ASPA, supra note 104, § 2002(9).
167 In the debate over Resolution 1422, the United States threatened to veto a re-
newal of the extension of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia/Herzegovina, and ar-
gued that this was necessary in order to provide protection for its military from
prosecution by the ICC. See U.N. Press Release: Bosnia, supra note 65.  This argument
ignores the mandate of the ICTY in Bosnia/Herzegovina whose jurisdiction continues
unabated under Resolution 1422 and which, as previously seen, offers far less protec-
tions for U.S. servicemembers than the ICC.  Nor is this rebutted by a supposed safety-
valve sounding in a lack of ICTY autonomy (as it receives its funding from the Security
Council) because a compromise position was proffered during the (Resolution 1422)
debate by France, which proposed that the ICTY be given primary jurisdiction vis-a`-vis
peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia. Id. This compromise is arguably consistent
with complementarity and with the generally pervasive jurisdiction of the ICTY.  The
U.S. refusal to accept the compromise (which essentially has the same effect as Reso-
lution 1422 in former Yugoslavia of exempting ICC jurisdiction) illustrates that the
administration’s arguments are pretextual.  U.S. military personnel would not need
protection from political prosecution from the ICC owing to the pervasive jurisdiction
of the ICTY.  To put it another way, protection from the ICC would be pointless as
U.S. peacekeepers would still be subject to greater or equal risk of prosecution by the
ICTY.  Clearly, Resolution 1422 was a proactive attempt to destroy the creditability of
the Court and not an attempt to protect U.S. peacekeepers.  Another probable reason
the U.S. refused the compromise was Resolution 1422’s extension of ICC immunity to
peacekeepers in all of the world’s peacekeeping theatres.  This broad extension of
immunity was agreed to despite being tied to a vote on the extension of peacekeeping
solely in Bosnia/Herzegovina.  Nonetheless, this fails to explain the administration’s
inconsistent treatment of the ICC as juxtaposed with the ICTY, as it took no steps to
provide protection from the ICTY to U.S. peacekeepers in former Yugoslavia.
168 Given the massive military and diplomatic resources at the disposal of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, it is unlikely that criminal liability would go very high up the chain
of command even if the International Criminal Court assumed jurisdiction and the
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(particularly during interrogation of those suspected of possessing
information relevant to terrorist activities), unlawful detention of
civilians, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of ag-
gression.169  This view was reflected by a member of the European
Parliament who asked, in reference to the U.S. policy regarding
Article 98 treaties, whether “the United States values the ability of
its military to commit war crimes such that it devalues a safer world
and would threaten violence on its long-time allies.”170
Though this view has generally been considered extreme and
criticized as either an insupportable exaggeration or a mis-
characterization of the administration’s motives, it is interesting to
note the poignant observation of Mr. Ferencz, Chief Prosecutor in
the Nuremberg trial against Nazi extermination squads (Einsatz-
gruppen), concerning Guantanamo detainees.  “It is sadly ironic
that those who oppose the ICC as a ‘kangaroo court’171 raise no
objection to [the] United States detaining suspected terrorists
under conditions that deny them rights that would exist for any
American tried by the ICC.”172  Some critics of the International
Criminal Court suggest that if the U.S. were a signatory to the
treaty then it would be liable for the treatment of the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay (and other locations) because, under Article
8(2)(a)(vi) of the Rome Statute, it is a crime to willfully deprive a
POW “or other protected person of the rights to a fair and regular
trial.”173
United States was a signatory.  Even so, an international criminal trial, even of low
level offenders, would usher in protracted negative publicity that the Bush administra-
tion would find politically disadvantageous.  Absent international scrutiny, the admin-
istration can rely on “imbedded journalists” and others to keep the activities
performed in its name out of view and beyond public debate.  This fear has been
echoed in conclusions declaring that “[T]he ICC can affect the United States by
merely investigating alleged crimes and engaging in public criticism and judgment of
U.S. military actions.” See Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 97.
169 As the crime of aggression has not been defined by the Assembly of States, it
carries no extant liability.  However, forward-looking administration officials fear that
its anticipated viability would impinge upon the ability of future American leaders to
wage war, as evidenced by Undersecretary of State John Bolton’s  concerns that the
U.S. might be accused of aggression.” See Ferencz, supra note 43, at 235.
170 Telci, supra note 158, at 486.
171 Senator Jessie Helms referred to the ICC as an “international kangaroo court.”
See Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 385 n.25 (2002).
172 See Ferencz, supra note 43, at 233
173 See Goldsmith, supra note 37 at 96 n.27, who further argued that if Afghanistan
were a signatory to the Rome Statute, then the U.S. might be liable to the ICC for
denying the detainees their rights to a trial, “unlawfully confining” them and allegedly
treating them “inhumanely” or for “willfully causing them great suffering.” (citing
ICC Art. 8(2)(a)(ii)-(iii)).
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In spring, 2004, certain events came to light that rebut the
classification of this view as an insupportable exaggeration or a mis-
characterization of the administration’s motives.  On April 28,
2004, the American TV program “60 Minutes II” aired photos of
hooded Iraqi detainees “piled in a human pyramid and simulating
sex acts, as U.S. soldiers celebrated.  One photo showed a hooded
prisoner standing on a box with wires attached to his hands; the
prisoner was told, falsely, that he would be electrocuted if he fell
off the box.”174  These atrocities and more were committed in the
prison of Abu Ghraib and other Coalition-run detention facilities.
The allegations, some admitted by the administration, expose prac-
tices of degradation, humiliation, torture, unlawful detention, and
other violations of the third and fourth Geneva Convention of
1949.175
Initially, spokespersons for the U.S. attempted to minimize the
allegations by suggesting that the abuses were confined to a small
number of prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison at the hands of only
a few members of the U.S. armed forces.176  However, these limita-
tions were deceptive as the International Committee of the Red
Cross (“ICRC”) had previously documented hundreds of examples
of abuse and violations of the Geneva Conventions177 at a mini-
174 Dana Milbank, US Tries to Calm Furor Caused by Photos: Bush Vows Punishment for
Abuse of Prisoners, WASH. POST, May 1, 2004, at A1.
175 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, arts. 3 & 4, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/
b/91.htm.
176 Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, a military spokesperson, stated that the abuses
involved fewer than twenty  prisoners out of approximately 8,000 at Abu Ghraib
prison.  Milbank, supra note 174, at A16.  Additionally, in that same newspaper article,
Michael Rubin, the former political adviser to the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Au-
thority and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, was quoted stating,
“It is a disaster.  Five or six people have managed to soil the reputation of American
soldiers worldwide.” Id.
177 In addition to the humiliating and degrading treatment noted in the world
press, the ICRC documented practices of the misuse of lethal force resulting in death
or injury; threats against family members (particularly wives and daughters); hooding;
tight handcuffing; use of stress positions (kneeling, squatting, standing with arms
raised over the head) for three or four hours; striking prisoners with rifle butts; slaps;
punches; prolonged exposure to the sun; isolation in dark cells; being urinated upon;
kicks to the head, lower back and groin; and in one case, an individual was force-fed a
baseball which was secured to his mouth by a scarf and then deprived of sleep for four
consecutive days.  Additional abuses include burnings; electric shocks (after being
doused with water); threats to rape a detainee’s wife; simulated Russian roulette prac-
tices; confiscation of personal property; solitary confinement (in the dark) for twenty-
three hours a day; starvation and deprivation of clothing; being paraded (and some-
times photographed) naked in front of other detainees and guards, sometimes
hooded or with women’s underwear over their heads (several prisoners were only
given women’s underwear to wear); and being kept hooded in temperatures of 122
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mum of 14 U.S.-run Iraqi detention facilities, and had informed
those members of the U.S. military responsible both orally and in
the form of a confidential written report provided in February,
2004.178  The report of the ICRC was intended to be confidential as
is customary,179 so the U.S. spokespersons’ false statements were
made with the assumption that the contradictory ICRC report
would never be made public.180  Subsequently, the Army has an-
degrees or higher.  Some prisoners were kept in compounds where they were vulnera-
ble to shelling and others were given hazardous duty which, in one case exposed
prisoners to exploding cluster bombs that resulted in the double amputation of two
men’s legs and the single amputation of a third’s.  According to the ICRC report,
these practices were evidenced not only by allegations but were confirmed by medical
examinations conducted by ICRC staff and, in some cases, by statements from the
guards, interrogators and members of military intelligence.  Some of the abuses were
witnessed by representatives of the ICRC, and the ICRC medical staff found, inter alia,
marks, scars, psychological symptoms, broken bones, sensory loss, hematomas, blood
in the urine and deaths.  Other evidence comes from U.S. medical reports including
autopsies and the now famous pictures distributed worldwide. See International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on
the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the
Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation, Feb. 2004, availa-
ble at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/icrc_report_iraq_
feb2004.htm [hereinafter ICRC Report].
178 The ICRC began monitoring the conditions in Iraq beginning in March 2003
and found that “ill-treatment during capture was frequent,” and concluded that the
abuses took place at multiple times and locations including, inter alia, Baghdad, Bas-
rah, Ramadi, and Tikrit. Id. at 3.  The ICRC conducted twenty-nine visits in fourteen
detention facilities and at the end of each visit, ICRC personnel “[held] a final talk
with the detaining authorities to inform them about the ICRC’s findings and recom-
mendations.” Id. at 1.  In February 2004 the ICRC completed its report, detailing
numerous violations, and submitted it to the Coalition forces. See generally id.
179 In a press release issued by the ICRC’s Director of Operations Pierre Krahen-
buhl, the ICRC emphasized “that the report (excerpts of the report) was made availa-
ble to the public without the consent of the ICRC,” as they contain confidential
information and are “intended only for the authorities to which they are presented.”
Press Release, Pierre Kra¨henbu¨hl, Director of Operations, International Committee
of the Red Cross, Iraq: ICRC Explains Position Over Detention Report and Treatment
of Prisoners (May 8, 2004), available at www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/
5YRMYC?OpenDocument.
180 In addition to statements made prior to the release of the ICRC report, some
U.S. officials continue to mischaracterize the report even after it has been leaked to
the public.  Brig. Gen. Janis L. Karpinski, Commander of the 800th Military Police
Brigade who was admonished over the Abu Ghraib scandal, alleged in an on-line in-
terview sponsored by the Washington Post, that the abuses were not corrected after
the ICRC report because the ICRC made no prior mention of the abuses. Prison Abuse
Scandal, Live Online discussion, May 14, 2004, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A24845-2004May13.html.  This ignores the ICRC practice of de-
briefing all prison authorities immediately following all on-site visits (total of twenty-
nine visits at fourteen detention facilities since March 2003), and the fact that the
report was provided to authorities in February 2004 and the abuses continued until at
least May 2004. Moreover, Brig. Gen. Karpinski claimed that “[t]here was nothing
specific in the ICRC report – just some potential areas of concern.” Id. This falla-
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nounced that they are purportedly investigating the deaths of 127
prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan.181
In response to these atrocities, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan stated that he was “deeply disturbed by the pictures of Iraqi
prisoners being mistreated and humiliated.”182 UNICEF reported
that the organization was “profoundly disturbed by news reports
alleging that children might have been among those abused in de-
tention centers and prisons in Iraq . . . [and] that any mistreat-
ment, sexual abuse, exploitation or torture of children in
detention is a violation of international law.”183  Kenneth Roth, Ex-
ecutive Director of Human Rights Watch, stated that the adminis-
tration’s policy regarding interrogation techniques resulted in the
sexual abuse of the prisoners and “is a logical consequence of [the]
system put in place after Sept. 11, 2001.”184  He also stated that
“[c]oupled with anger at other lawless practices, such as the Bush
administration’s refusal to apply the Geneva Conventions to the
Guantanamo detainees, that revulsion has contributed to
America’s plummeting esteem.”185
Yet in light of the repeated revelations of abuses and the dele-
terious effect it has had on the international reputation of the
United States, the Bush administration seems content to do little
cious assertion ignores, inter alia, the hundreds of examples of documented abuses in
the report specifying at which facilities the on-going abuses occurred, when they oc-
curred and, in many cases, the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention being
violated and recommended remedial actions. See ICRC Report, supra note 177.
181 James Kuhnhenn and Sumana Chatterjee, Abuse Inquiry Seeks Wider Pattern,
MIAMI HERALD, June 13, 2004, at 26A.
182 U.N. Press Release, Secretary-General ‘Deeply Disturbed’ by Media Pictures of
Iraqi Prisoners Being Mistreated, SG/SM/9283 IK/432, at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2004/sgsm9283.doc.htm (Apr. 30, 2004).
183 U.N. News ServiceCentre, Iraq: UNICEF ‘Profoundly Disturbed’ by Allegations of
Abuse of Detained Children, available at http://electroniciraq.net/news/1493.shtml
(May 11, 2004) (on file with New York City Law Review).  In addition, acting U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Bertrand Ramcharan “expressed revulsion
regarding the reports and photographs,” id., and the Special Rapporteur on Torture,
also expressed “serious[ ] concern[ ]” about recent reports of torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment of Iraqi detainees by the United States of America
and United Kingdom military forces serving under the Coalition Provisional Author-
ity.”  U.N. Press Release, Special Rapporteur on Torture Seriously Concerned About
Reports of Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners by Coalition Forces, HR/4740 IK/434, at www.un.
org/News/Press/docs/2004/hr4740.doc.htm (May 3, 2004).
184 Kenneth Roth, Editorial, Time to Stop ‘Stress and Duress,’ WASH. POST, May 13,
2004, at A29.  See also Human Rights Watch, Timeline of Detainee Abuse Allegations and
Responses, at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/07/usint8556_txt.htm (last vis-
ited May 7, 2005), which partially details reports of US instigated torture and mistreat-
ment of detainees by US forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and other undisclosed locations
since December 25, 2002.
185 Roth, Time to Stop, supra note 184.
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more than to make public condemnations.  Indeed, the adminis-
tration’s response has been to bring in Major General Geoffrey D.
Miller, the commander of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility
to take charge of the Iraqi facilities.186  This appointment is a slap
in the face to all those who suffered abuses at the hands of the
American military and reflects a complete lack of sensitivity to their
plight and the views of the international human rights community.
These disturbing images of the United States as a major
human rights violator, whose national policy condones torture, es-
chews the rule of law and holds itself above the mandate of interna-
tional law including, inter alia, the Geneva Conventions and the
Convention Against Torture,187 should come as no surprise as the
U.S. took affirmative steps to put these images in motion.  The ci-
vilian authorities at the Pentagon changed official military policy
concerning interrogation of prisoners including the removal of
JAG (Judge Advocate General) oversight of interrogation of prison-
ers and the use of private contractors188 not subject to “The Uni-
186 Milbank, supra note 174.
187 There is also a notion that the U.S. violates domestic federal law, such as the
War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, enacted in 1996, which prohibits the commission
of war crimes (including torture) by or against U.S. personnel (including officials)
with respect to, inter alia, detainees.  In certain circumstances, the penalty for viola-
tions of this Act includes the death penalty.
188 According to Scott Horton, a human rights activist and a partner at Patterson,
Belknap, Webb and Tyler and chairperson of the Committee on International Law of
the New York City Bar Association, “senior officers” of the Judge Advocate General’s
Office (JAG) approached him with these concerns in the spring of 2003 and “ex-
pressed apprehension over how their political appointee bosses were handling the
torture issue” and that they were creating “an atmosphere of legal ambiguity” that
would allow mistreatment of prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Joe Conason, Lack of
Protection, Long Before Abu Ghraib, U.S. Senior Officers Warned of Prisoner Abuse, SALON
(May 7, 2004), at http://www.salon.com/opinion/conason/2004/05/07/rights/in-
dex.html.  The New York City Bar Association Committee on International Human
Rights authored a 110-page report citing Defense Undersecretary for Policy, Douglas
Feith, as quoted by subordinates, who made an “offhand” remark that the “‘Geneva
Accords’ on the treatment of prisoners are laws ‘in the service of terrorists.’”  Arnaud
de Borchgrave, Commentary: The blame shuffle in Iraq, UNITED PRESS INT’L (May 11,
2004), at http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040511-072104-3118r.  Addition-
ally, “one Deputy Counsel at the Pentagon, a staunch Republican, recently resigned
because, as he explained not for attribution, ‘right-wing ideologues are putting at risk
the reputation of the U.S. military.’” Id.  See Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Committee on International Human Rights, Committee on Military Affairs and
Justice, Human Rights Standards Applicable to the United States’ Interrogation of Detainees;
Conason, supra; Letters to Leaders: Is Torture a Few Isolated Incidents?, Congress.org, at
http://congress.org/congressorg/bio/userletter/?letter_id+90441006 (last visited
May 24, 2004).  Cf. CBSNEWS.com, New Military Interrogation Rules, May 14, 2004 at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/15/iraq/main617653.shtml?CMP=ILC-
SearchStories (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) (discussing Pentagon response to outcry
against harsh interrogation tactics).
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form Code of Military Justice.”
In the autumn of 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
approved a harsher set of guidelines for the interrogation of pris-
oners specifically targeted at the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.189
In response to concerns raised by military lawyers, a new set of
norms replaced these guidelines in April 2003.190  In June 2004 a
previously classified memo (Working Group Report), which served
as the basis for the April 2003 guidelines was made public191 and
disclosed what some consider “ways of conducting interrogations
in the war on terror that would allow guards to evade future prose-
cutions for torture.”192  The Working Group Report articulates that
because torture is a specific intent crime, liability requires that “the
infliction of pain” must be the interrogator’s “precise objective,”193
instead of obtaining information.  Thus, extreme infliction of pain
and humiliating and degrading treatment incidental to the objec-
tive of obtaining intelligence are not torture.194  This impossibly
narrow interpretation has been highly criticized by legal schol-
ars.195  If this narrow interpretation was applicable in domestic
courts it would probably serve to free a substantial population of
convicted felons as prosecutors would never be able to prove in-
tent,196 and it seems to fly in the face of the common law principle
189 Bradley Graham, Interrogation Techniques Tactics Evolved, Rumsfeld Approved Harsh
Procedures at Guantanamo, Officials Say, WASH. POST, May 21, 2004, at A16.
190 Id.
191 The report is titled, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the
Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational
Considerations, at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/PentagonReportMarch.
pdf (Mar. 6, 2003) (on file with the New York City Law Review) [hereinafter Working
Group Report]. See Michael Hirsh, New Torture Furor: A Defense Department Memo Pro-
vides a Legal Roadmap for Prisoner Interrogation, NEWSWEEK, Web Exclusive (June 8,
2004), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5167122/site/newsweek/.
192 Hirsch, supra note 191.
193 Working Group Report, supra note 191, at 8.
194 Even under the narrow definition of torture in the Working Group Report,
some of the atrocities detailed in the ICRC report suggest that certain behavior com-
mitted by U.S. guards in Iraqi detention facilities were perpetrated solely for “mali-
cious and sadistic” purposes and not to gather information, albeit the distinction is a
seemingly impossible one to draw. See Hirsch, supra note 191.
195 These scholars include Scott Horton, supra, of New York and Phillip Heymann
of Harvard Law School who concluded that “[t]he country has a right to expect far
better from the [government] lawyers who are responsible for keeping the president’s
actions legal.” Id.
196 Under this definition, the torturers during the famous Spanish Inquisition
would not be guilty because their “precise objective” was to save souls through the
attrition of confession, which is further evidenced by their practice of giving a quick
(relatively painless) death to those last minute confessors instead of burning them at
the stake. See 3 HENRY CHARLES LEA, A HISTORY OF THE INQUISITION OF SPAIN, Book
7.4, at 192 (1906-07), available at http://libro.uca.edu/lea3/lea3.htm (last visited Apr.
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that the accused are presumed to have intended the natural conse-
quences of their acts.  This construction only serves to encourage
the practices exhibited in the Iraqi detention facilities.
Perhaps equally disturbing, the Working Group Report states,
“The Department of Justice has concluded that customary interna-
tional law cannot bind the Executive Branch under the Constitu-
tion because it is not federal law.”197  Additionally, the Report cites
another memo198 stating that “any presidential decision in the cur-
rent conflict, concerning the detention and trial of al Qaeda or
Taliban militia prisoners would constitute a ‘controlling’ Executive
act that would immediately and completely override any customary
international law norms.”199  This denial of even the most sacro-
sanct international norms exposes the current administration’s
contempt for international oversight and reveals the predicate atti-
tudes behind its war on the International Criminal Court.
This brief recitation of facts is not intended to exhaustively
discuss the Bush administration’s unilateral approach to interna-
tional relations or hostility to generally recognized human rights
policy; rather this broad stroke treatment is designed to illustrate
the culture within which this administration operates in order to
more fully explain the approach it has taken regarding the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.  An administration that considers itself
above international law and justifies the use of torture, denigrates
the Geneva Conventions,200 deprives (alleged enemy combatant)
suspects of due process, decries transparency, and adheres to im-
possible self-serving interpretations of treaty obligations and do-
mestic legislation, would naturally be opposed to the operation of
6, 2005).  Of course this conclusion is unreasonable, but the example serves to illus-
trate the sophistry of the government’s narrow construction of the mens rea ex-
pressed in the Working Group Report.
197 Working Group Report, supra note 191, at 6.
198 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t. of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties and
Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.
org/torturefoia/released/DOJ_Memo_012202.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
199 Working Group Report, supra note 191, at 6.
200 See Draft Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to
George W. Bush, President, Decision Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on
Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaida and the Taliban (Jan. 22, 2002) (on file
with the New York City Law Review) [hereinafter Draft Memorandum]; Michael Isikoff,
Memos Reveal War Crimes Warnings, NEWSWEEK (May 19, 2004), at http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/4999734/site/newsweek/.  In this memorandum, White House Counsel
Gonzales describes some of the provisions of the Geneva Convention as “quaint” and
advises against adherence to other provisions because “this new paradigm [war on
terror] renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prison-
ers.” Draft Memorandum, supra.
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an autonomous permanent international criminal tribunal that as-
sumes jurisdiction without exemption of U.S. personnel and
officials.
Indeed some have suggested that President Bush fears future
prosecution of himself and administration officials for war
crimes201 based upon a memo issued by then White House Counsel
Alberto R. Gonzales.202  This memo advised the President to con-
tinue to assert that the al Qaeda and Taliban suspects are not cov-
ered by the Geneva Convention203 based upon their status as non-
state actors or officials of a non-recognized government because it
“substantially reduces the threat of domestic criminal prosecution
under the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. 2441).”204  Mr. Gonzales also
discusses the threat of domestic prosecution of administration offi-
cials by independent counsel under the War Crimes Act.205  The
threat of the politically motivated prosecutor (domestic or interna-
tional) seems to be a recurring fear of the Bush administration.
While Counsel’s frank discussion of the White House avoiding
prosecution for war crimes deals with domestic liability, its applica-
bility to foreign liability is apparent.  It is particularly relevant in
light of the Iraq war where administration officials cannot resort to
the precedent of the Afghanistan campaign (whose non-recog-
nized Taliban government was treated as a non-state actor in order
to avoid liability under the Geneva Convention), because the U.S.
has officially recognized the Iraqi government and cannot now as-
sert the inapplicability of the Geneva Convention.206  To insulate
administration officials, they must operate beyond the scrutiny of
an international criminal tribunal.  The presence and language of
this memo serves to reveal the seriousness with which White House
Counsel and the President take the threat that administration offi-
cials may be subject to prosecution for war crimes.
Furthermore, the current administration’s policy of engaging
201 Isikoff, supra note 200.
202 Draft Memorandum, supra note 200.
203 Secretary of State, Colin Powell, firmly opposed the administration’s refusal to
provide the detainees with prisoner of war status as provided by the Geneva Conven-
tions, and this view was also expressed by Mr. Powell’s legal advisor. See id. at 1.
204 Id. at 2.
205 “[I]t is difficult to predict the motives of prosecutors and independent counsels
who may in the future decide to pursue unwarranted charges based on Section 2441.
Your determination would create a reasonable basis in law that Section 2441 does not
apply, which would provide a solid defense to any future prosecution.” Id.
206 However, it must be noted that because neither the United States nor Iraq are
member states of the ICC, they would not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court in
spite of the applicability of the Geneva Convention.
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in massive human rights violations, or knowingly approving viola-
tions by subordinates in the fight against terrorism, is self-defeating
and counter-productive as it only serves to fan the flames of terror-
ism such that “[a]llies are less willing to cooperate in combating
terrorism, and terrorist recruiters must be having a field day.”207
Additionally, by making its war on the ICC second only to its war
on terrorism, the administration is alienating allies whose coopera-
tion is essential to effectively combat terrorism.  Closer cooperation
with allies can lead to mutual access to information vital in the in-
vestigation of terrorist activity and thwarting future terrorist
attacks.
Legislation like ASPA and diplomatic sanctions tied to Article
98 treaties “contradicts the goal of establishing allied support.”208
By not only opposing the ICC but attempting to “actively thwart it,
America seems to be going in the exact opposite direction and
alienating its allies just when it claims to need them most.”209  In-
stead, quasi-unilateralism and resort to massive human rights viola-
tions (by employing immoral and unethical means of investigation
such as torture and unlawful detention of innocents)210 only in-
creases terrorist activity and does not serve to make the world a
safer place.211
In spite of the polarized actions previously undertaken by the
administration, certain recent developments tend to suggest that
the administration is taking a more moderate approach to the ICC
and the observation of human rights generally.  In June 2004 the
administration distanced itself from the Working Group Report,
claiming that it is overbroad and, according to the Washington
Post, the CIA has announced that it will halt the use of some “en-
hanced interrogation techniques” previously approved by the
207 Roth, Time to Stop, supra note 184.
208 Faulhaber, supra note 46, at 556.
209 Id.
210 In its report on the humanitarian violations in Iraq, the ICRC noted that they
were informed by certain Coalition Forces intelligence officers that they “estimate
between 70% and 90% of the persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq had been ar-
rested by mistake,” and “sometimes they arrested all adult males present in a house,
including elderly, handicapped or sick people.”  ICRC Report, supra note 177, at 7-8.
211 If the U.S. had been a signatory to the Rome Statute, then the terrorist attack on
September 11, 2001 could have come under the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court as the attacks qualify as a crime against humanity, yet
“[p]aradoxically, while the United States is leading the rest of the world in the war
against terrorism after the wake of September 11, 2001, it is also leading and instigat-
ing opposition to frustrate the effective operation of the ICC.”  Chibueze, supra note
1, at 23-24.
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White House.212  Moreover, the reversal of the Secretary of Defense
on acceptable military standards for aggressive interrogation tech-
niques and the administration’s backing down from the renewal of
the U.N. resolution granting blanket immunity for peacekeepers213
are both encouraging indications consistent with the goals of the
ICC and the international observation of human rights.
Unfortunately, optimism may be premature as the administra-
tion’s assertions minimizing the Working Group Report are self-
serving and probably the product of international political pres-
sure in the context of acquiring NATO support for Iraqi rebuilding
efforts and domestic political pressures during a re-election cam-
paign.  The optimism surrounding the changes in interrogation
techniques instituted by both the CIA and military intelligence are
tempered by the administration’s refusal to provide details con-
cerning the exact nature of the changes.  Furthermore, the admin-
istration’s decision not to pursue a renewal of the immunity for
peacekeepers may also be grounded in the aforementioned politi-
cal pressures rather than a new vision of the ICC.  Ambassador
Cunningham stated that the U.S. will “continue to negotiate bilat-
eral agreements consistent with Article 98 of the Rome Statute to
further protect U.S. persons from the exercise of jurisdiction by
the ICC.”214  In addition, Ambassador Cunningham made the omi-
nous statement that “the United States will [now] need to take into
account the risk of ICC review when determining contributions to
U.N. authorized or established [peacekeeping] operations,”215 thus
suggesting that the U.S. may make good on its previous threat to
withhold peacekeepers.
Fears of international interference and scrutiny of its military
endeavors around the world may not be the only motive the admin-
istration has for destroying the International Criminal Court.  It
may fear interference with other U.S. activities, notably economic
ones.  As indicated by the remarks of Secretary Bolton, the current
administration seeks to discourage interference with its activities
around the world and requires “blanket coverage” from the reach
of the ICC.216  Bolton expresses the need for protection of “eco-
212 “Enhanced interrogation techniques” include feigned drowning and refusal to
provide pain medication for injuries, among other techniques.  BBC News, CIA ‘halts
interrogation tactics,’ June 27, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3843939.
stm (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
213 Cunningham, supra note 102.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Bolton, Remarks at AEI, supra note 68.
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nomic activity” around the world,217 and includes a long list of
others in need of exemption from the court’s jurisdiction (al-
though it is difficult to see why exchange students and weapons
inspectors need protection from prosecution of the most atrocious
international crimes).218  These sentiments suggest that the cur-
rent U.S. administration anticipated massive foreign resistance to
its proposed policy initiatives on the war on terrorism and the inva-
sion of Iraq.  Additionally, U.S. policy attempts to circumvent po-
tential liability of U.S. economic interests abroad but begs the
question as to why government officials and corporate representa-
tives would need protection from prosecution sounding in geno-
cide and crimes against humanity.
In an editorial in the June 25, 2004, edition of the Christian
Science Monitor the author suggests that the chief prosecutor, Luis
Moreno-Ocampo, “wants to go after corporate officials who do any
business with nations that have committed mass atrocities.”219  The
editorial provides no proof of this allegation but is instructive as it
reflects a vision of ICC persecution of U.S. economic interests that
is consistent with the remarks made by Secretary Bolton.  There are
examples of U.S. corporations acting in complicity with human
rights violators abroad in the interest of increasing profits, as illus-
trated by the sharp rise in recent years of cases brought under the
Alien Torts Claims Act.220  However, there is no evidence that the
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Wary US Eye on UN Court, supra note 21.
220 Recently, the Unocal Corporation settled an Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”)
case (for an undisclosed amount) alleging the company’s complicity in human rights
abuses with its partner, the brutal military regime of Burma/Myanmar known as
SLORC (The State Law and Order Restoration Council).  The complaint alleges co-
erced labor, forced removal of villagers, murder, rape, and torture. See Center for
Constitutional Rights, Corporate Accountability, Doe v. Unocal, Synopsis, at http://www.
ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/corporate_accountability/corporateArticle.asp?ObjID=LRRSFK
nmmm&Content=45 (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).  Other examples of alleged corpo-
rate complicity in human rights atrocities include, inter alia, Royal Dutch/Shell oil
group’s conspiracy with the Nigerian government in an attempt to suppress the
Ogoni peoples’ opposition to the defendants’ longstanding history of environmental
and human rights abuses in the Ogoni region pursuant to their efforts to build a
pipeline.  These abuses include the extra-judicial execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and
John Kpuinen (environmental and community leaders) by hanging and torturing,
and unlawfully detaining others and shooting a woman who was peacefully protesting
the destruction of her crops.  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3293 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2002).  Other similar examples include: Fresh Del
Monte Produce, Inc.’s conspiracy in the alleged intimidation of union leaders in Gua-
temala by torture, kidnapping, unlawful detention, crimes against humanity, denial of
the right to association/organize, and extra-judicial killing; Aldana v. Fresh Del
Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Chevron’s alleged sup-
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ICC is targeting U.S. corporations, nor would it assume jurisdiction
over a corporation merely conducting business unless it could
show actual complicity in the commission of atrocities.
Unfortunately, many nations with the worst human rights
records possess natural resources greatly prized by U.S. economic
interests or are located in the most strategic geographic locations
for U.S. military purposes.  It could be perceived as contrary to na-
tional interests (though a boon to human rights protection) if the
leaders of these states were tried and removed by the ICC, and
their relationship with U.S. economic and military interests were
disrupted.  Furthermore, in the course of independent investiga-
tion it is foreseeable that ICC prosecutors could unravel examples
of complicity in human rights abuses by U.S. government officials
or U.S. corporate leaders who, though immune from prosecution
by virtue of the ASPA legislation and the threat of U.S. military
might, could nonetheless suffer massive negative publicity with the
resultant political and diplomatic ramifications.  Accordingly, ex-
emption from ICC jurisdiction alone is not enough to completely
insulate U.S. interests; its operation in any form is perceived as a
threat.
Coincidental to these developments, and in its post 9/11 war
against terror, the United States has drastically enlarged its spend-
ing on military aid.  This new policy has degraded human rights
“by lifting sanctions on arms transfers to countries with poor
pression of peaceful protests against its environmental practices in Parabe, Opia and
Ikenyan, Nigeria by systematic violations of human rights including summary execu-
tion, torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; Bowoto v. Chevron Tex-
aco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004); DynCorp’s spraying of toxic
herbicides in an effort to eradicate cocaine and heroin crops in Ecuador, causing
medical problems including congenital birth defects, permanent skin irritations, blis-
ters and death, loss of subsistence crops and livestock as well as torture, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and extra-judicial killing; Arias v. DynCorp, No. 1:01CV01908
(D.D.C. filed Sept. 11, 2001); villagers from Aceh, Indonesia allegedly suffered extra-
judicial killing, torture, and crimes against humanity at the hands of Indonesian mili-
tary who, although responsible for the massacres in East Timor, were hired by Exxon
Mobil to provide security for its natural gas facilities, despite the fact that executives of
Exxon Mobil had specific knowledge of atrocities committed by its security forces;
Doe v. Exxon Mobil, No. 01CV01357 (D.D.C. filed June 19, 2001); Coca-Cola manag-
ers’ consent to the targeting and extermination of trade union leaders by Columbian
paramilitaries; Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003);
the extra-judicial killing of trade union leaders by paramilitaries allegedly hired by
Drummond Company, Inc., in Colombia; Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256
F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003); corporate complicity in South Africa, In re S. Afri-
can Apartheid Litig. v. Citigroup, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); alleged
illegal testing of drugs on children in Kano, Nigeria; Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 Fed.
Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2003); and environmental and human rights abuses in Papua New
Guinea, Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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human rights records and by cutting required approval times for
such transfers.”221  While the U.S. is cutting military aid to tradi-
tional democratic allies, it has been lifting bans on military aid to,
among others, states with particularly heinous human rights
records.  Among these States are Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, the Philip-
pines, Oman,222 Indonesia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emir-
ates.223  The current administration is, in effect, providing
heretofore denied military aid to some of the worst human rights
violators in the world on the condition that they endorse a bilateral
treaty which, owing to its reciprocity, precludes their criminal lia-
bility for continued human rights violations.
This military aid will serve to increase the human rights viola-
tions perpetrated against citizens of these regimes.  This mass suf-
fering caused by the change in U.S. policy can only be predicated
on protecting U.S. military and economic interests abroad.  By as-
suring the U.S. military and American corporations a free hand in
their States, certain foreign leaders can perpetrate the most wan-
ton human rights violations without this arrangement being im-
peded by an international criminal tribunal.  In the words of John
R. Bolton, “This broad scope of coverage [from Article 98 agree-
ments] is essential to ensuring that the ICC will not become an
impediment to U.S. activities around the world.”224
IV. CONCLUSION
In the political chasm created by the fall of the former Soviet
Union, a rare moment of international unity gave birth to the ICC
and witnessed an unprecedented global commitment to human
rights.  The scope, jurisdiction, and permanence of this Court dis-
tinguished it from all former and existing tribunals.  Yet, despite
this celebration of the rights of humanity, the United States in gen-
eral, and the Bush administration in particular, has undertaken ex-
traordinary efforts to dismantle the Court.  By making this effort
the cornerstone of its foreign policy, by threatening to withhold
military aid and desperately needed peacekeeping forces, by im-
posing Article 98 treaties as a prerequisite to normal relations, and
by implementing the American Servicemembers Protection Act
that grossly overcompensates for greatly exaggerated or nonexis-
221 Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Military Aid After 9/11 Threatens Human Rights, (Feb.
15, 2002), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/02/usmil0215.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2005).
222 Id.
223 HRW, Dangerous Dealings, supra note 6, at 9, 12-13.
224 Bolton, Remarks at AEI, supra note 68.
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tent threats, the Bush administration is squarely seeking to destroy
the Court.
In response, the administration has sought to diminish its cul-
pability by downplaying the extent of its efforts against the Court
and relying upon several official U.S. criticisms.  Some of these crit-
icisms such as the seven-year delay in the enforcement of war
crimes (instead of ten years) are specious and disingenuous as they
were the product of negotiation and compromise in which U.S.
representatives took a leading role.  Principally however, the salient
issue as it relates to the United States is state sovereignty.  As the
world’s lone superpower, the U.S. finds this issue to be especially
important.  The real motives do not lie in jurisdictional issues or
threats to U.S. servicemembers but rather in a perceived fear of a
diminution of U.S. global power and influence militarily, diplomat-
ically, and economically.  Opponents of the Court argue that em-
bracing it would serve to subordinate U.S. power and autonomy to
one vote amongst many without veto capabilities.  The bedrock
supposition of this argument is that a world order based on force
instead of the rule of law is preferable to those in possession of the
greatest force.
Additionally, it is imminently foreseeable that the ICC could
cause some difficulties for the Bush administration’s foreign policy
by curbing the excesses of the U.S. forces and leadership in its
quest for continued military and economic world dominance.  It is
foreseeable that the ICC would encumber the administration’s ef-
forts in such initiatives as the “war on terror,” and the largely uni-
lateral invasion and occupation of Iraq.  The administration seeks
to avoid international scrutiny of such practices as unilateral war,
an impossibly expanded notion of the doctrine of preemption, lia-
bility for the commission of war crimes, and the mistreatment and
torture of detainees held in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, Afghani-
stan and other “shadow” facilities.  Moreover, the administration
seeks to protect American economic interests and the oftentimes
corrupt and inhuman foreign leaders with whom they do business.
The seriousness with which the administration takes the threat of
this international scrutiny is manifest in the severity of the steps it
has taken to dismantle the Court.
The implications of the U.S. policy with respect to the ICC in
terms of human carnage are grave.  In attempting to disen-
franchise international efforts to bring about a new global order
mandating individual accountability and rule of law, the U.S. may
have callously condemned millions of souls to misery and death.
52 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:1
By lifting the ban on military aid to nations with poor human rights
records in conjunction with hostile attempts to circumvent the
ICC, the Bush administration’s practices of justifying and perpe-
trating torture, eschewing transparency, and employing a unilater-
alist protocol, will undoubtedly reap dividends of human suffering
for years.  Like Nuremberg before it, the ICC is a Court whose time
has come, but the dire peril in which it finds itself as a conse-
quence of U.S. activities may sound a death knell to the hopes of
an order of human dignity.
